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Executive Summary
Capital Account Liberalization in China:  
A Cautionary Tale
Kevin P. Gallagher, José Antonio Ocampo, Ming Zhang, Yu Yongding
In many ways, China can be seen as the great “globalizer”. Rather than abruptly 
opening to global trade under the “Washington Consensus,” beginning in the 
early 1980s China followed 
the pragmatic expression 
attributed to its great reformer 
Deng Xiaoping: “cross the 
river by feeling each stone.” 
China combined opening to 
global trade with significant 
and gradually sequenced 
government attention to infra-
structure, industrialization, and logistics to become the largest trader on earth in 
just a few decades. Such an approach will prove even more important as China 
considers the need to globalize its financial sector. The history of other emerging 
markets’ experiences with financial liberalization offers China some lessons as 
well. Fully opening the Chinese financial system will require keen attention to 
prioritizing other important reforms and to designing a strong and flexible set of 
cross-border financial regulations. Such regulations will be important to prevent-
ing and mitigating financial fragility and ensuring that financial markets serve the 
productive employment of the Chinese people. 
These words of caution come out of a February 2014 workshop of the Pardee 
Task Force for Regulating Capital Flows at Boston University. The workshop 
was sponsored by Boston University’s Global Economic Governance Initiative, 
along with Columbia University’s Initiative for Policy Dialogue, and the Institute 
for World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It 
brought together scholars and policy-makers who discussed experiences with 
viii    
China would do well to draw lessons from 
both the economics literature and country 
experiences with capital account liberal-
ization. Such an approach would guide 
China to adopt a carefully sequenced and 
cautionary approach to capital account 
liberalization.
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capital account liberalization in Japan, India, South Korea, Latin America, Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, and beyond. Participants also reviewed the economic 
evidence pertaining to capital account liberalization, as well as new policy at the 
International Monetary Fund with respect to financial globalization. 
This executive summary synthesizes some of the main themes and policy rec-
ommendations discussed at the workshop and presented in this report, though 
the specific recommendations discussed here are our own. The main message is 
that China would do well to draw lessons from both the economics literature and 
country experiences with capital account liberalization. Such an approach would 
guide China to adopt a carefully sequenced and cautionary approach to capital 
account liberalization. 
Capital Account Liberalization in China
Regulating the inflow and outflow of capital has been a cornerstone of China’s 
development reforms. For more than three decades after Deng Xiaoping’s crucial 
reforms began, China’s capital account policies were part of an apparatus to 
direct credit toward strategic development goals while maintaining financial 
stability. That period of economic history in China is among its best ever and 
among the best ever in the world, having recorded more than 10 percent income 
growth per year for those decades. Moreover, its limited financial globaliza-
tion helped keep reforms on track. During the 1990s when emerging markets, 
especially in Asia, were wrecked by contagious financial crises, China’s relatively 
closed capital account buffered the country from the worst of those crises.
Chinese officials have decided that a new economic model is needed, and thus 
China has been experimenting with a variety of reforms toward that new model. 
Gradual capital account liberalization started in 1994. Since then, China has 
removed almost all restrictions for inbound foreign direct investment and loos-
ened controls over portfolio investments—though maintaining quota schemes—
but cross-border money market transactions and financial derivatives have 
remained under strict control. However, as a result of RMB internationalization, 
China’s capital account liberalization has accelerated since 2009. The RMB trade 
settlement scheme and so-called “recycling mechanism” has led to a significant 
opening of short-term cross-border capital flows. The trading of the RMB in 
Hong Kong has created significant opportunity and risk for RMB exchange rate 
arbitrage. Owing to stable RMB appreciation expectations, carry trade against 
the RMB became rampant. The development of the Hong Kong market along 
with other markets and the partial opening of the capital account for short-term 
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cross-border capital flows has led some to suggest that China’s capital account is 
even more porous than policy would suggest. According to one estimate, China’s 
gross cross-border bank exposure stood at $1 trillion in 2014, or 12 percent of 
China’s GDP (Verma 2014). Since 2009 a new two-track capital flow regulation 
structure has been established. The cross-border capital flows denominated by 
USD were still regulated by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) 
at the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) which was more strict; however, the capital 
flows denominated by RMB were regulated by the subsidiaries of Department 
of Monetary Policy II under PBOC, which was much looser. In other words, the 
experiment of RMB internationalization opened new loopholes for short-term 
capital flows into and out of China.
China appears to have re-committed to this exercise during its 18th Party Con-
gress in 2013, where China said it would work to: 
“Promote bidirectional openness for capital markets, raise the extent of 
convertibility of cross-border capital and financial trading, establish and 
complete foreign debt and capital flow management systems under pru-
dential macro-level management frameworks, accelerate the realization 
of the convertibility of Renminbi capital accounts.” (CPC Central Commit-
tee 2013)
Therefore, it is not fruitful to debate whether China should open its capital 
account, because the decision to move forward already has been made. How-
ever, it is still vitally important to consider how the capital account should be 
opened, and at what pace.
Risks Associated with Capital Account Liberalization
Theoretically speaking, capital account liberalization can bring significant bene-
fits to an economy after a nation has reached a certain threshold of institutional 
capabilities needed to manage its financial sector. Capital account openness 
can create more financial sector competition, enable portfolio diversification, 
and provide finance for current account imbalances. By the turn of the century, 
many nations from both the industrialized and developing world had open 
capital accounts. 
However, according to the economics literature there is no clear association 
between capital account liberalization and economic growth in emerging 
markets. Moreover, there appears to be an association between capital account 
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liberalization and the incidence of financial crises. Finally, there is also evidence 
that capital account liberalization can lead to increased inequality.
Olivier Jeanne, Arvind Subramanian, and John Williamson of the Peterson Insti-
tute for International Economics did a comprehensive survey of the literature on 
capital account liberalization and economic growth and found that there is no 
clear cut relationship between the two. Indeed, the authors (two of them former 
IMF officials) go so far as to conclude that “the international community should 
not seek to promote totally free trade in assets—even over the long run—because 
free capital mobility seems to have little benefit in terms of long run growth” 
(Jeanne et al. 2012, 5). 
Columbia University economists José Antonio Ocampo, Shari Spiegel, and 
Joseph Stiglitz, as well as Harvard University economists Kenneth Rogoff and 
Carmen Reinhart, have also shown that capital account liberalization is asso-
ciated with an increased incidence of banking crises in a country (Ocampo, 
Spiegel, and Stiglitz 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Examples of such crises 
over recent decades are Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, South Korea, Russia, Iceland, 
and Latvia. Open capital accounts leave emerging markets susceptible to the 
pro-cyclical nature of global finance. Short-term capital flows occur in surges 
and sudden stops that can be a cause of financial fragility. A surge in capital 
inflows can lead to exchange rate appreciation, a swelling of asset prices, and 
an expansion of bank balance sheets given that actors feel that they have more 
collateral at hand for foreign currency denominated debts. All of this can unwind 
during a sudden stop of capital flows: currencies depreciate significantly and bal-
ance sheets expand as financial actors still need to pay debt in foreign currency 
(Korinek 2011). 
Of particular concern for China may be new evidence that capital account 
liberalization can be associated with rising inequality. An IMF study written by 
Furceri and Loungani (2013) examined over 50 cases of capital account liberal-
ization in advanced economies, and found that inequality (as measured by the 
Gini coefficient) increased by approximately one percent during the first year 
after liberalization and by as much as two percent after five years.
Government officials and economists also fear that capital account liberaliza-
tion causes a loss in policy autonomy for economic policy-making. It has long 
been established that policy-makers face a “trilemma” when it comes to the 
capital account. The economist Robert Mundel formalized work of John Maynard 
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Keynes that established that a country can only use two of the three instruments 
commonplace in a world of international finance: the use of the interest rate as a 
monetary policy tool, the control of the exchange rate, or the regulation of cross-
border financial flows. The loss of policy autonomy when the capital account has 
been liberalized could be even more severe than Mundel proposed, as authori-
ties may lose full monetary control and in a sense would be able to choose only 
where they want capital account volatility to be reflected: in monetary and credit 
aggregates, or in the exchange rate. With respect to China, there are also signifi-
cant sterilization costs associated with managing the exchange rate with respect 
to the trilemma. 
The Importance of Sequencing
The risks associated with capital account liberalization are unsettling. That is 
why there is an emerging consensus that capital account liberalization, if pur-
sued, should to be sequenced according to country-specific characteristics. The 
International Monetary Fund 
(2012) conducted a thor-
ough re-evaluation of capital 
account liberalization and 
the management of capital 
flows from 2010 to 2012 and 
produced a new ‘institutional view’ on such matters. The new view notes that 
exchange rate flexibility, monetary reform, and financial regulation are among 
the pre-requisites that may be necessary for countries to benefit from capital 
account liberalization. As Kenji Aramaki in this report notes, Japan is considered 
the exemplar in terms of sequencing the opening of the capital account, a pro-
cess that took over 40 years to complete after significant reform of its exchange 
rate, interest rate, and financial sector policies.
Indeed, there is also a growing consensus that the option to regulate cross-bor-
der financial flows should be a permanent feature of any 21st century financial 
system, even one that is relatively open. New research in economic theory has 
stipulated that it may be optimal—rather than distortionary—to regulate surges in 
capital inflows. In the presence of significant information externalities, investors 
do not internalize their contribution to the system risks associated with surges 
and sudden stops. Conditions when numerous market participants make invest-
ments without incorporating such risks can quickly lead to financial instability. 
Thus, the case is made for counter-cyclical Pigouvian taxes on the inflows of 
New research in economic theory has stipu-
lated that it may be optimal—rather than 
distortionary—to regulate surges in capital 
inflows.
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capital in order to correct for such inherent market failures in the financial sector 
(Korinek 2011).
Most econometric evidence finds that regulations on the inflow of capital can 
have the desired impact if designed and implemented properly. A comprehen-
sive review of the literature before the financial crisis—that includes nations with 
open capital accounts such as Chile and Colombia—for the National Bureau of 
Economic Research in the United States concluded that: “In sum, capital controls 
on inflows seem to: make monetary policy more independent and alter the com-
position of capital flows; to a lesser extent it seems to reduce real exchange rate 
pressures” (Magud et al. 2011, 13). 
In the wake of the financial crisis a number of countries with open capital 
accounts have begun to re-introduce regulations on the inflow and outflow of 
capital. Nations such as Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan are among 
those that regulated cross-border finance in the wake of the financial crisis, 
while maintaining some level of capital account openness (Erten and Ocampo 
2013; Gallagher 2014).
Lessons for China: Reform and Regulate First
It will be important for China to sequence capital account liberalization in 
tandem with other economic reforms and regulations in order to maintain eco-
nomic growth, productive employment, social cohesion, and financial stability 
in the country. 
In terms of sequencing, it will be important to reform interest rates and 
exchange rates before fully opening the capital account—especially to short-
term debt, portfolio, and derivatives flows. Very low interest rates, coupled with 
the fact that China’s savers will seek to diversify their portfolios as the Chinese 
economy adjusts to re-balancing, may bring some risks. A recent IMF study 
suggests that liberalization could trigger net outflows from both equity and bond 
markets as domestic investors seek to diversify large domestic savings (Bayoumi 
and Ohnsorge 2013).
It will also serve China well to put in place significant domestic financial regula-
tions in order to maintain financial stability. Two important regulations that 
need priority attention are the implementation of a national deposit insurance 
company to allow for the bankruptcy and liquidation of domestic financial 
institutions and a full-fledged macro-prudential regulatory regime to avoid asset 
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bubbles. Of key importance in such a macro-prudential regime would be the 
regulation of the rapidly expanding set of shadow banking products in China.
Counter-cyclical capital flow management regulations are needed in tandem 
with those macro-prudential regulations. Interest rate and growth differentials 
between China and the rest of the world will leave the country susceptible to 
pro-cyclical surges and sudden stops of short-term capital flows. Two countries 
with open capital accounts, Brazil and South Korea, have been pioneering in this 
area. Both countries have pieces of legislation that permanently allow the mon-
etary and financial authorities to regulate cross-border financial flows in a flex-
ible manner on an as needed basis. Both countries were struck with significant 
financial crises after they liberalized their capital accounts. They thus decided 
to reintroduce regulations on the inflow and sometimes outflow of capital in a 
counter-cyclical manner. 
In recent times, the channels for surges and sudden stops of capital flows in 
Brazil and South Korea have been the foreign exchange derivatives market via 
the carry trade. Both countries designed regulations to attempt to stem the fragil-
ity associated with such flows. South Korea’s regulations have been much more 
successful because the derivatives market is deliverable and conducted onshore. 
Brazil’s market is non-deliverable and much of it is conducted offshore—making 
it much more difficult for the authorities to regulate. 
Finally, it will be important for China to ensure that it maintains the policy space 
to regulate cross-border finance as needed. Recently, the IMF has articulated a 
new “institutional view” on capital flow management that recognizes the need 
to regulate capital flows. This move has expanded the policy space to regulate 
capital flows in an institution that was once very adverse to regulating capital. 
However, certain commitments under the World Trade Organization’s General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, and under some free trade agreements and bi-
lateral investment treaties make it more difficult to regulate cross-border finance 
(Gallagher and Stanley 2013). Indeed, the negotiating position of the United 
States under the United States–China Bilateral Investment Treaty negotiations 
is that China should not be permitted to regulate cross-border finance without 
recourse. In its negotiations on an investment treaty with Germany, China was 
able to maintain the policy space to regulate capital (Anderson 2009). China 
should seek to strike such a balance in all future treaties moving forward.
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Chinese authorities have always taken a gradual and sequenced approach to 
the reform process. It is paramount that such an approach be applied to capital 
account liberalization. Gradual liberalization after higher priority reforms that 
are safeguarded by strong regulation of both the domestic financial system 
and cross-border finance is a prudent course of action. In so doing, China will 
not have to learn the hard way—as so many other countries across the world 
have—that premature financial opening can lead to financial crises, slow growth, 
and inequality. Such a course of action will maintain China’s tools to continue to 
deliver long-run prosperity for its people.
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1. Financial Openness of China and India:  
Implications for Capital Account Liberalization
Guonan Ma and Robert N. McCauley
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, policymakers in both China and India have announced their inten-
tion to further liberalize their still heavily managed capital accounts. The world 
has a huge stake in China and India integrating their finances into global markets 
without disruptive spillovers to the global financial markets (Hooley 2013). This 
is all the more true for China, which is larger and shows a stronger willingness to 
undertake incremental capital account liberalization over the coming years. 
The extent to which these economies have already become financially integrated 
with the rest of the world serves as a practical starting point for policymakers 
managing the task of further capital opening, by indicating potential challenges 
and attendant risks. A starting point of considerable integration would suggest 
that China and India have little to lose and much to gain if the opening serves 
to force the pace of domestic financial liberalization. Little financial integration, 
however, would indicate greater risks and larger required adjustments in the 
domestic economy and markets in response to capital opening.
Much analysis of capital account openness uses the Chinn–Ito (2008) index, an 
interval, de jure measure derived from four on–off variables in the IMF’s Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions (Figure 1, left-hand panel). 
For de facto openness, “the most widely used measure” (IMF 2010:51) is the ratio 
of the sum of international assets and liabilities to GDP (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
2003, 2007) (Figure 1, right-hand panel). 
We question whether these measures appropriately track the progress and rela-
tive position of China and India on the road to international financial integra-
tion.1 We disagree with Chinn–Ito that China and India are both stalled on the 
road and agree with Lane and Milesi-Ferretti that both are often moving for-
ward—that is, opening up. Admittedly, the process sometimes can be two steps 
1 See Lane and Schmuckler (2007); and Aizenman and Sengupta (2011). 
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forwards and one step back. Moreover, we question whether Chinn–Ito (tied) or 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (China ahead) have their relative positions right, at least 
on average for the past decade. 
We also question an emerging consensus regarding implications of capital 
opening for capital flows. Both He et al. (2012) and Bayoumi and Ohnesorge 
(2013) argue that when China fully opens up its capital account, there will be 
not only larger external positions but also, on balance, larger net private assets. 
By contrast, Bayoumi and Ohnesorge (2013) expect India to experience little net 
private capital outflows. Neither study considers stocks of bank assets, which are 
inherently difficult to model. Our findings on the pricing of the three financial 
instruments onshore and offshore raise questions about this consensus, since 
relative prices would encourage bank inflows. In particular, our finding that in 
China money-market instruments are cheap onshore leaves us concerned that 
these baseline projections that neglect bank assets are missing the potential for 
huge short-term inflows. 
We raise these questions based on an examination of three de facto price-based 
measures. For currency forwards, short-term interest rates and equity prices, 
we analyze average deviations from the law of one price. The basic idea is that, 
other things being equal and under normal market conditions, onshore and 
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Figure 1: Capital Account Openness of China and India:  
De Jure and De Facto Measures
Source: The IMF’s International Financial Statistics (<www.econdata.com/databases/imf-and-other-
international/ifs/‎>) and World Economic Outlook (<www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo>).
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offshore prices of the same underlying financial instrument should be about the 
same if capital is mobile. 
Also, we offer cross-country benchmarks as well as bilateral comparisons as a 
gauge of the remaining challenge of the capital account opening task. Finally, we 
look at the signs of these price gaps to see whether each financial instrument is 
priced more cheaply onshore or offshore, which can serve as signals of positive 
pressures from inward or outward private capital flows, respectively. 
We advance four hypotheses, two in the time series (ts) and two in the cross-
section (xs), and subject them to the evidence of the past decade: 2003–13.
Hts1: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti are right: both China and India are opening.
Hxs1: Chinn–Ito and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti are wrong: India is more open 
than China.
Hts2: Both China and India remain some distance from financial openness. 
Hxs2: China faces net inflow pressures in the short term while India may face 
more balanced outflows and inflows when opening up. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Sections two to four present evidence on 
the three measures of onshore–offshore price gaps for foreign exchange forwards, 
money-market yields and stock market prices. Section five draws on the evi-
dence on price gaps to explore implications for China’s capital opening, while 
the final section draws conclusions for the future. 
ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE FOREIGN EXCHANGE FORWARDS
We first contrast forward foreign exchange rates in Shanghai or Mumbai with 
those traded offshore in Hong Kong, Singapore, or Tokyo. Capital mobility 
tends to equalize onshore and offshore forward rates. Thus, the currency with 
smaller differences in rates at home and abroad is more financially open. We 
define cross-border price gaps so that a positive value indicates that contracts 
are cheaper onshore. For currency forwards, a positive gap means that a dol-
lar fetches more renminbi or rupee in Shanghai or Mumbai than offshore. For 
money markets, a positive gap means that prices are lower (yields higher) in 
Shanghai or Mumbai than offshore. For equities, a positive gap means shares are 
cheaper onshore.
Capital Account Liberalization in China    1514   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  October 2014
As Liu and Otani (2005) argued, this measure benefits from using directly 
observed prices; but our comparison can only start when China inaugurated its 
onshore forward currency market in 2003. Since traders can access the domestic 
forward currency market only on the basis of “real demand”—that is, underlying 
transactions backed by trade documents—domestic forward rates can differ from 
those in the offshore non-deliverable market, where all comers can transact.2 
We define the onshore–offshore forward currency gap as in Equation 1.
Equation 1
Forward currency gapt = (Ft – NDFt)/St
In Equation 1, Ft is the onshore forward; NDFt is the non-deliverable offshore 
forward; and St is the onshore spot exchange rate—all expressed as domestic 
currency per U.S. dollar. A positive forward premium gap indicates the respec-
tive currency is cheaper—that is, priced for less appreciation or more deprecia-
tion—onshore than offshore. This in turn would likely attract more inflows than 
outflows when the capital account opens up. 
Figure 2 (p. 16) strikes the 
eye with how both currencies 
became cheap offshore after 
the Lehman failure, both at 
the 3-month (left-hand panel) 
and the 12-month (right-hand 
panel) tenor. It is also strik-
ing how expensive the longer 
forward of the renminbi used 
to be offshore, where speculators paid up in anticipation of its move from 8.2 to 
6.1 per dollar. Also observe the sharp widening in the onshore/offshore foreign 
exchange forward gaps during the GFC, probably because of the market disloca-
tions to be discussed below. Both the sign and the size of the forward gaps for the 
renminbi and rupee correlate substantially, possibly suggesting that some global 
factors, such as the sentiment of global investors and market uncertainties, may 
play a meaningful role in the evolution of the forward gaps. 
Table 1 (p. 16) confirms that over the past decade, 2003–13, the average of the 
forward gap for the renminbi is clearly larger than that of the rupee. Hence 
2 On NDFs, see Ma et al. (2004); Misra and Behera (2006); Ma and McCauley (2008a, 2008b); and McCauley 
et al. (2014). 
On balance, trading of currency forwards 
suggests India has been more financially 
open than China over the past decade, 
more so for the pre-crisis period than the 
post-crisis period, though China is catch-
ing up faster and noticeably narrowing 
India’s lead since the GFC.
Capital Account Liberalization in China    1514   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  October 2014
the forward markets onshore and offshore have been more segmented for the 
renminbi than for the rupee, for both 3-month and 12-month tenors and for both 
the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods. In this sense, India is financially more 
integrated with the global financial market than is China. 
The dynamics of their forward premium gaps have, however, been quite dif-
ferent before and after the GFC. In particular, for both tenors, the onshore–off-
shore forward currency gaps of the renminbi have narrowed noticeably since 
the crisis, suggesting that China has become more open financially over recent 
years. Not so for India, which has witnessed wider forward premium gaps since 
the GFC. One possible reason could be the Chinese Government’s promotion of 
external use of the renminbi, facilitating cross-border arbitrage. Another could 
relate to the emerging market sell-off in the wake of the expected U.S. Federal 
Reserve’s tapering signal mostly in the third quarter of 2013, which most hurt 
deficit emerging economies. Of course, one can ask why this last particular 
shock was so asymmetric and different for the renminbi and the rupee (Ma and 
McCauley 2013; McCauley et al. 2014). Regardless, one may argue that on this 
measure of the foreign exchange forward gap, China has been liberalizing but 
India has been less so, or even the other way around. 
Moreover, while the renminbi is priced cheaper onshore than offshore in the 
foreign exchange forward markets in all cases, the Indian rupee forward is mostly 
more expensive onshore in most cases. This holds true for both the full sample 
and the pre- and post-crisis periods. In other words, when the capital account 
opens up, the renminbi will most likely face appreciation and net private capital 
inflow pressures while the rupee may endure some depreciation and net private 
outflow pressures. Even the adjustments can take place mainly through position-
ing rather than actual cross-border flows; expectations may bias broader gross pri-
vate capital inflows in case of a cheaper currency in the onshore forward market.
On balance, trading of currency forwards suggests India has been more finan-
cially open than China over the past decade, more so for the pre-crisis period 
than the post-crisis period, though China is catching up faster and noticeably nar-
rowing India’s lead since the GFC. Upon capital opening, China may see stronger 
private capital inflow pressures than India does, other things being equal.
If currency forwards suggest that India has remained more open than China on 
average over the past decade, albeit with a shrinking lead, how far do they have 
to go in terms of capital account liberalization? The euro/dollar trades, except 
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in the most extreme markets, at the same rate in Frankfurt and in New York. 
Among currencies with a non-deliverable forward (NDF), the Korean won has 
the biggest and most integrated market. Post-crisis, the rupee forward gap is 
Table	  1:	  Onshore	  Less	  Offshore	  Foreign	  Exchange	  Forward	  Premiums	  
(percentage	  of	  the	  spot)	  
	  
	   Three-­‐month	   Twelve-­‐month	  
	   Pre-­‐	  	  
crisis	  
Post-­‐	  
crisis	  
Full	  
sample	  
Pre-­‐	  
crisis	  
Post-­‐	  
crisis	  
Full	  
sample	  
Period	  average	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
CNY1	   0.5126	   0.0494	   0.2508	   1.8510	   0.3851	   1.0518	  
INR	   –0.0399	   –0.0029	   –0.0928	   0.0297	   –0.0745	   –0.1601	  
KRW	   –0.3007	   –0.0287	   –0.1726	   –0.1263	   –0.1015	   –0.1334	  
Benchmark1,	  2	   –0.1315	   0.1019	   –0.0369	   –0.3403	   0.2510	   –0.0766	  
Average	  of	  	  	  
absolute	  value	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
CNY1	   0.5303	   0.3279	   0.4489	   1.8549	   0.7464	   1.3290	  
INR	   0.2579	   0.2849	   0.3334	   0.4476	   0.6142	   0.6511	  
KRW	   0.4365	   0.2056	   0.3406	   0.4676	   0.2562	   0.3865	  
Benchmark1,	  2	   0.5828	   0.3634	   0.4628	   1.1589	   0.7246	   0.8964	  
1	   Data	   start	   7	   April	   2003	   for	   renminbi,	   7	   January	   2004	   for	   Colombian	   peso,	   12	   January	   2012	   for	  
Russian	  ruble.	  
2	   Benchmark	   averages	  Brazilian	   real,	   Colombian	  peso,	   Indonesian	   rupiah,	   Philippine	   peso,	   Russian	  
ruble	  and	  Taiwanese	  dollar.	  
	  
Note:	  Daily	  data	  of	  forward	  premium	  gap	  are	  calculated	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  onshore	  forward	  
and	  offshore	  non-­‐deliverable	  forward	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  spot	  price.	  Closing	  at	  Tokyo	  8	  pm	  for	  Asian	  
currencies;	  at	  London	  6	  pm	   for	  Russian	  ruble;	  at	  New	  York	  5	  pm	   for	  Brazilian	  real	  and	  Colombian	  
peso.	  The	  full	  sample	  period	  is	  between	  6	  January	  2003	  and	  31	  December	  2013;	  the	  crisis	  period	  is	  
between	  September	  and	  December	  2008.	  
	  
Source:	  Bloomberg;	  Reuters.	  
	  
Table 1: nshore Less Offshore Foreign Exchange Forward Premiums  
r ntage of the spot)
Source: Bloomberg; Reuters.
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Figure 2: Onshore Foreign Exchange Forward Less Offshore Non-Deliverable 
Forwards (as percentage of spot rate)1
Sources: Bloomberg; CEIC.
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between that of the won and a benchmark of six other NDF currencies for both 
tenors (Table 1). By contrast, the larger average absolute values for the renminbi 
are close to a benchmark of six other NDF currencies and point to weaker arbi-
trage and thus a longer way to go in capital opening.
ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
We next compare short-term yields onshore and offshore. Otani and Tiwari 
(1981) compared yen yields in Tokyo and offshore, and Frankel (1992) prescribed 
such comparisons to test for capital mobility. Prior to the expansion of the 
offshore renminbi market in 2010, we do not observe offshore yields for both 
currencies; rather we infer yields from NDFs, assuming they are priced off dollar 
Libor—a reasonable assumption before the GFC.3 
Equation 2
NDFt = St(1+it)/(1+rt$)
In Equation 2, i is the implied offshore interest rate on the home currency and 
rt$ is dollar Libor. Rearranging terms, we extract the implied offshore interest 
rate (Equation 3). 
Equation 3
it = NDFt*(1+rt$)/St – 1 
The onshore–offshore money yield gap is defined as (rt–it), where rt is the 
directly observed onshore 3-month bank rate or a 12-month government bill 
rate. If (rt–it) differs significantly from zero, the offshore market is segmented 
from the onshore. A positive money yield gap indicates that money-market 
instruments are priced cheaper (yield more) onshore than offshore. A smaller 
mean of the absolute yield gap points to greater financial openness. 
Money-market yield gaps have narrowed somewhat for both economies in the 
2000s (Figure 3). Ma et al. (2004) and Kohli (2011) found that this happened for 
the rupee in the early 2000s. The renminbi gap has narrowed since the GFC, but 
the rupee gap widened instead. Again, we observe noted co-movements in the 
3 The GFC broke down covered interest parity (Baba and Packer 2009), observationally equivalent to pervasive 
capital controls. With a global ‘dollar shortage’ (McGuire and von Peter 2009), U.S. dollar Libor cannot safely be 
inserted into Equation 3. Mancini and Ranaldo (2011) test interest rate parity without Libor. If dollar yields were 
equal onshore and offshore, and forwards were priced off interest differentials, our yield gaps would simply be 
transformations of the forward gaps above. But onshore dollar yields can and do deviate from offshore levels. 
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yield gaps of the renminbi and rupee, indicating possible important global driv-
ers in addition to local impediments. 
In sum, most of the main findings for the foreign exchange forward gap also 
hold in the case of the money yield gap. Each and every pairwise comparison 
strongly suggests that over the past decade, cross-border arbitrage continued to 
have freer play in India to keep yields in line (Table 2). On balance, onshore and 
inferred offshore money rates, like trading of currency forwards, identify India as 
more financially open than China over the past decade, for the full sample, the 
pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period, though its lead has been narrowing. 
More interestingly, again, the post-crisis yield gap of the rupee has widened over 
the pre-crisis counterpart, while that of the renminbi has narrowed considerably 
and is rapidly converging with the rupee gap in the wake of the GFC. On this 
measure, China again is catching up in terms of financial openness. 
One main difference between the currency forward and money-market instruments 
is that for both currencies, money-market instruments have been cheaper onshore 
than offshore, indicating potentially greater private capital inflows than outflows, at 
least under money-market instruments, once their capital accounts open further. 
Again, the benchmark won suggests that both renminbi and rupee money 
remain some distance from high financial integration. In particular, onshore and 
offshore rupee yields remain further apart than their won counterparts even 
?
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Figure 3: Onshore Money-Market Yield Less Offshore NDF-Implied Yield  
(in basis points)
Source: Bloomberg; CEIC
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though the won gaps also widened after the crisis (and before the crisis relative 
to 2003–04) (Ma et al. 2004, 90). If the rupee has a way to go, the renminbi has 
still further, but apparently the renminbi is catching up rapidly, while after the 
crisis, the rupee appears to backstep and gradually lose its lead. 
INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION OF EQUITY MARKETS
The Chinese and Indian authorities have also run natural experiments by allow-
ing firms to list their shares on exchanges both in Shanghai or Mumbai and in 
Hong Kong or New York. Onshore and offshore trades take place in different cur-
rencies, but a free flow of capital would ensure only minor differences in prices. 
Deviations from the law of one price point to markets segmented by official 
limits on foreign shareholdings in domestic markets. Following Levy-Yeyati et al 
(2009), we analyze the difference between onshore and offshore share prices and 
the speed of their convergence. 
We construct indices of shares that are cross-listed in Shanghai, Hong Kong, and 
New York on the one hand (Peng et al. 2008), and Mumbai and New York on the 
other. We weigh individual share price differentials by market capitalizations 
in Hong Kong and Mumbai. We define the price gap as the ratio of the offshore 
to onshore prices: a ratio greater than 100 indicates the share trades cheaper 
onshore than offshore. The closer this “cross-market price premium” is to 100, 
the higher is the degree of onshore and offshore equity markets. Our Chinese 
Table	  2:	  Onshore	  Money-­‐Market	  Yield	  Less	  Offshore	  NDF-­‐Implied	  Yield	  
	  (Basis	  point)	  
	  
	   Three-­‐month	   Twelve-­‐month	  
	   Pre-­‐	  
crisis	  
Post-­‐	  
crisis	  
Full	  
sample	  
Pre-­‐	  
crisis	  
Post-­‐	  
crisis	  
Full	  
sample	  
Period	  average	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
CNY	   436.8	   316.1	   354.7	   381.1	   208.2	   280.1	  
INR	   148.0	   181.5	   146.3	   101.5	   107.7	   95.0	  
KRW	   49.5	   105.2	   90.6	   67.2	   98.9	   89.2	  
Average	  of	  
absolute	  value	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
CNY	   437.0	   345.3	   392.7	   381.1	   235.4	   308.9	  
INR	   192.7	   212.9	   215.2	   132.1	   138.4	   141.1	  
KRW	   76.6	   113.8	   111.6	   68.5	   99.5	   90.7	  
Notes:	  Daily	  data.	  For	  China:	  3-­‐month	  (12-­‐month)	  NDF,	  3-­‐month	  Chibor	  (one-­‐year	  PBC	  bill	  auction	  
yield	  before	  July	  2008;	  secondary	  market	  yield	  thereafter),	  and	  3-­‐month	  (12-­‐month)	  Libor.	  For	  India:	  
3-­‐month	  (12-­‐month)	  NDF,	  3-­‐month	  Mibor	  (364-­‐day	  Treasury	  Bill	   implicit	  yield),	  and	  3-­‐month	  (12-­‐
month)	   Libor.	   For	   Korea:	   3-­‐month	   (12-­‐month)	   NDF,	   3-­‐month	   certificate	   of	   deposit	   rate	   (one-­‐year	  
Treasury	  Bond	  yield	   in	  the	  secondary	  market),	  and	  three-­‐month	  (12-­‐month)	  Libor.	  The	  full	  sample	  
period	  is	  between	  27	  May	  2003	  and	  31	  December	  2013;	  the	  crisis	  period	  is	  between	  September	  and	  
December	  2008.	  
Sources:	  Bloomberg;	  CEIC.	  	  
	  
Table 2: O shore Money-Market Yield Less Offshore NDF-Implied Yield 
(basis points)
Sources: Bloomberg; CEIC.
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index in Figure 4 resembles the commercial ‘Hang Seng China AH [A: Shanghai; 
H: Hong Kong] Premium Index’ (Ma and McCauley 2013). 
A threshold observation is that the line for India lies above 100, while the lines 
for China lie below 100. Indian shares tend to be cheaper onshore. By contrast, 
Chinese shares trade at a premium in Shanghai over their prices in Hong Kong 
or New York. Chinese investors wish they could buy Chinese equities at Hong 
Kong or New York prices. Thus, the more expensive share prices in Shanghai 
would likely prompt more private outflows than inflows, once restrictions on the 
capital account are further removed. The opposite is true for India. Nevertheless, 
by late 2013, the Shanghai premium and Mumbai discount had largely vanished. 
Indeed, the Chinese equity market integration has come a long way and even 
appeared to have taken a small lead over India’s by 2013. 
Table 3 confirms that price differentials have tended to narrow since the GFC. 
Before the crisis, Indian shares in New York traded at a 30 percent premium, 
while Chinese shares in Hong Kong traded at a discount of more than 45 per-
cent. After the crisis, the New York premium narrowed to less than 10 percent 
for Indian companies and the Hong Kong discount to some 20 percent for Chi-
nese companies. So India managed to sustain the financial opening in the equity 
market, contrasting the back-stepping seen for the two fixed-income markets. 
While for the full sample of 1999 and 2013, the Indian equity market is much 
more internationally integrated than that of China, it still has a long way to go 
when measured against the close alignment of prices of Chinese shares in Hong 
Kong and New York. Similarly, the Indian equity market has a way to go when 
compared with the sample 0.12 percent mean difference between onshore and 
offshore share prices for a sample of emerging markets in Levy-Yeyati et al. 
(2009, 441).
Table 3 also reports estimates of the half-life of the convergence of onshore and 
offshore share prices to their centers of gravity for the periods before and after 
the crisis. This half-life is estimated from Equation 4 (Peng et al. 2008).
Equation 4
Δqi,t = α + ßqi,t–1 + Σ ϕn Δqi,t–n + εi,t
In Equation 4, qi,t is the logarithm of the overseas–local share price ratio for the 
cross-listed companies; Δ is the first difference operator. Since the estimated ß < 
0, the speed of convergence, or half-life of a shock, to the premium can be taken 
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as –ln(2)/ln(1 + ß). Table 3 shows mixed results, though for both the Chinese and 
the Indian markets, the half-life fell in half of the cases after the GFC, indicating 
more integration (Ma and McCauley 2013). Again on this measure, the Chinese 
equity market on average remained three to five times more segmented than the 
Indian equity market. In contrast to the instantaneous arbitrage between New 
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Figure 4: Ratios of Overseas Share Prices to Equivalent Local Share Prices 
(percent, weekly average)
Sources: Bloomberg; authors’ calculations.
Table	  3:	  Ratios	  of	  Overseas	  Share	  Prices	  to	  Local	  Share	  Prices	  and	  
Convergence	  Speed	  
	  
	   H-­‐A	  ratio	  
41	  dual-­‐
listed	  
companies	  
H-­‐A	  ratio	  
9	  triple-­‐
listed	  
companies	  
ADR-­‐A	  ratio	  
9	  triple-­‐
listed	  
companies	  
ADR-­‐H	  ratio	  
9	  triple-­‐
listed	  
companies	  
ADR-­‐India	  
ratio	  
9	  dual-­‐listed	  
companies	  
Period	  average	  	  
(%)1,2	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Pre-­‐crisis	   53.10	   53.30	   53.30	   99.89	   128.89	  
Post-­‐crisis	   87.67	   79.99	   79.93	   99.98	   108.07	  
Full	  sample	   64.91	   62.29	   62.25	   99.91	   121.64	  
Estimated	  half-­‐
life	  (days)2,	  3	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Pre-­‐crisis	   255	   125	   111	   1	   35	  
Post-­‐crisis	   109	   213	   162	   1	   13	  
Full	  sample	   259	   174	   142	   1	   49	  
1	  Ratio	  of	  overseas	  share	  price	   to	  equivalent	   local	  share	  price	   for	  cross-­‐listed	  companies;	  weighted	  
average	  based	  on	  Hong	  Kong	  market	  capitalization	  for	  China	  and	  domestic	  capitalization	  for	  India.	  	  
2	   The	   full	   sample	   period	   is	   between	   15	   March	   1999	   and	   31	   December	   2013;	   the	   crisis	   period	   is	  
between	  September	  and	  December	  2008.	  	  
3	  Based	  on	  estimation	  of	  Equation	  4	  in	  the	  text;	  see	  Annex	  1	  for	  details.	  
	  
Source:	  Bloomberg;	  authors’	  estimations.	  
	  
Table 3: Ratios of Overseas Share Prices to Local Share Prices and  
Convergence Speed
Source: Bloomberg; authors’ estimations.
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York and Hong Kong,4 that between New York and Mumbai takes weeks and 
that between Hong Kong and Shanghai takes months. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPITAL ACCOUNT OPENING 
In this section, we draw implications from our findings of price gaps for capi-
tal account opening, focusing on China’s case. Studies of the likely profile of 
China’s international assets and liabilities over the medium-term given capital 
account opening highlight the scope for net private outflows of portfolio and 
direct investment. On the direct investment front, China’s long-standing welcome 
for foreign companies contrasts with the quite recent adoption of the policy to 
encourage outward direct investment, particularly in commodity production. 
Limits on outward portfolio investment were eased just before the GFC and to 
this day the limits do not bind; but the upshot is that private portfolio claims on 
the rest of the world’s stocks and bonds remain low, and the potential increase 
appears huge as the capital account opens up and the income level rises.
He et al. (2012) and Bayoumi and Ohnsorge (2013) present reasonable medium-
term outlooks for a rise in net private external assets in the event of a full capital 
account liberalization in China. Both project big increases in gross positions, 
assets and liabilities alike, and 
both predict private assets 
would increase more than 
liabilities. Thus, both foresee 
that on net China should 
be expected to experience 
net private capital outflows 
following thorough capital 
account liberalization. Such net 
outflows would not necessarily 
put downward pressure on the renminbi’s value if the current account remains in 
surplus, or if offset by a policy of a drawdown of the sizeable official reserves. 
There are some differences between these exercises. He et al. (2012) examine 
both direct investment and portfolio stocks, and their result is driven by the 
legacy of asymmetric capital controls (with acquisition of external assets by pri-
vate Chinese more tightly controlled, especially in direct investment), financial 
market development in China and higher growth there. They project a larger 
step-up in direct investment net assets of 10 percent of GDP than that in net port-
4 Or a sample average of one to two days for emerging markets in Levy-Yeyati et al. (2009, 444).
Limits on outward portfolio investment 
were eased just before the GFC and to 
this day the limits do not bind; but the 
upshot is that private portfolio claims on 
the rest of the world’s stocks and bonds 
remain low, and the potential increase 
appears huge as the capital account 
opens up and the income level rises.
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Table	  4:	  Impact	  of	  Capital	  Account	  Liberalization	  in	  China	  on	  Direct	  and	  
Portfolio	  Investment	  (stock	  adjustment	  as	  percentage	  of	  GDP)	  
	  
	  
Bayoumi	  &	  Ornsorge	  
(2013)	  
He	  et	  al.	  
(2012)	  I	  
2020	  
Memo:	  
Actual	  
2010	  
	  
Adjusted	  
for	  smaller	  
domestic	  
stocks	  
FDI	  assets	   	   	   21.6	   5.3	  
FDI	  liabilities	   	   	   11.2	   25.1	  
Net	  FDI	   	   	   10.4	   –19.8	  
Portfolio	  assets	   15.4–24.9	   9.4–15.1	   24.2	   4.3	  
Portfolio	  liabilities	   1.7–9.9	   1.7–9.9	   16.4	   3.8	  
Net	  portfolio	   10.7–8.1	   4.1–8.2	   7.7	   0.6	  
	  
Source:	  Bayoumi	  and	  Ornsorge	  (2013:28);	  He	  et	  al.	  (2012:29).	  
	  
Table 4: Impact of Capital Account Liberalization in China on Direct and 
Portfolio Investment (stock adjustment as percentage of GDP)
Source: Bayoumi and Ornsorge (2013:28); He et al. (2012:29).
folio assets, of 8 percent of GDP (Table 4). Bayoumi and Ornsorge (2013) analyze 
portfolio stocks only and find the increase in net private assets could result from 
an increase in gross portfolio assets of 10–25 percent of GDP and gross liabilities 
of 2–10 percent of GDP (Table 4). The resulting increase in net portfolio assets of 
11–18 percent of GDP exceeds the 8 percent estimate of He et al. (2012).5 
Policymakers, however, have to be concerned about not only the medium-term 
resting place or steady state, but also the dynamic path, as well as the volatility 
realized along it. Both papers neglect the banking flows, which can be huge and 
volatile. This is understandable since the cross-country pattern of external bank 
assets and liabilities is hard to account for in standard modeling exercises. 
Moreover, these exercises based on stocks of financial assets and liabilities do 
not allow prices themselves to be a major driver of both portfolio and banking 
5 If the domestic equity market is adjusted for untraded shares and the domestic bond market is adjusted for 
bank-held bonds then Bayoumi and Ornsorge (2013) put the stock adjustment at only 4–8 percent of GDP. Any 
such projected net portfolio outflows or build-up in net private external assets could easily be accommodated by 
the official sector running down the large foreign exchange reserves resulting in a rebalancing between private and 
public portfolios. The privatization of China’s foreign assets should be seen as a natural consequence of allowing 
the private sector greater scope to buy foreign stocks and bonds (Ma and McCauley 2014). 
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flows in the short term. Our evidence on the onshore/offshore price gaps may 
help shed light on possible short-term dynamics of capital flows upon full capital 
account liberalization. In brief, we find that the inflow pressure in the money 
market is very strong in China, in sharp contrast with the medium-term prospect 
for portfolio and direct investment outflows. 
In particular, we have shown that the binding capital controls allow differences 
in forward exchange rates onshore and offshore, and also in onshore and off-
shore short-term interest rates. These price gaps tend to favor net private capital 
inflows rather than outflows, since the same financial instrument is priced 
cheaper onshore than offshore. 
Moreover, the portfolio inflow pressure can be seen more clearly by consulting 
an ex ante measure of the risk-adjusted return on money-market carry trades. 
We take the short-term interest rate differential as a ratio of short-term volatil-
ity implied in currency options—a simple version of the Sharpe ratio. Figure 5 
shows how attractive an open Chinese money market would be at recent levels 
of currency volatility. With three-month Shibor at 5 percent and Libor at 0.25 
percent and the implied volatility of the renminbi at less than 2 percent, non-
residents would be strongly attracted to the Chinese money market. 
Indeed, our simple Sharpe ratio for the renminbi averages 3.5 in recent months, 
compared to a range of 0.3 to 0.8 for other major emerging market currencies 
shown in Figure 5. Thus, the renminbi clearly represents an extremely attrac-
tive target among all the major emerging-market currencies for carry traders, 
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Figure 5: Sharpe Ratios
Sources: Bloomberg and BIS staff calculations.
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suggesting substantial pressures from inward bank and bond flows into China, at 
least in the short term. Even the increase in implied volatility associated with the 
mild renminbi depreciation around the widening of the renminbi daily trading 
band in mid-March 2014 left the carry-to-risk ratio very attractive (see below).6 
We have illustrated the strong incentives for fixed income inflows at the three-
month tenor, but the problem extends out the yield curve, albeit to a lesser 
extent. That is, the Chinese Government’s yields exceed the U.S. Government’s 
yields all the way out to 10 years and beyond. Since the Chinese yield curve is 
on the flat side, the yield gap narrows with maturity.
Near-term developments will not necessarily lessen the attraction of the Chinese 
money market. While the normalization of U.S. dollar rates would tend to nar-
row the gap with Chinese yields, the liberalization of interest rates in China is 
expected to widen it. He et al. (2014) use a variety of approaches to conclude that 
equilibrium yields in China 
could be 2.5–3 percent higher 
from the current regulated 
level. Such a rise would take 
the Chinese yield curve to 5–6 
percent at the short end and 
6–7 percent at the long end. 
On the U.S. side, Laskey and 
Whalen (2014) of the Congressional Budget Office project that the U.S. Federal 
Reserve will take short-term rates up to 3.5 percent later in this decade while 
10-year Treasury yields will rise to five percent. How precisely these two yield 
curves will relate to each other as normalization and liberalization play out is dif-
ficult to predict; but pressure from inward capital flows, especially at the short end, 
is a serious near-term prospect in light of a more liberal Chinese capital account. 
Thus, while domestic financial liberalization is often considered a prerequisite for 
further external financial opening, it can add to its immediate challenges. 
Our findings yield two useful insights for Chinese policymakers mandated to 
manage the task of capital account liberalization. First, the contrast between our 
short-term inflow pressures and the consensus medium-term outflow pressures 
could potentially imply volatility along the path towards full capital account 
openness. Policymakers need to carefully negotiate this risk-laden process. 
6 Note that in contrast, although India’s money-market rates at 8 percent are much more attractive taken in 
isolation, when the volatility of the rupee/dollar rate is factored in, the carry is not so attractive.
The renminbi clearly represents an 
extremely attractive target among all the 
major emerging-market currencies for carry 
traders, suggesting substantial pressures 
from inward bank and bond flows into 
China, at least in the short term. 
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Ocampo and Erten (this volume) suggest Chinese policymakers could first 
suspend the existing capital controls as a way to open up the capital account, 
without scrapping all the underlying institutional arrangements and control 
tools. At least, stronger and more transparent reporting and statistical systems 
could be put in place so that broad market positions and cross-border flows can 
be tracked in a timely and systematic fashion.
Second, a sustained increase in exchange rate variability ahead of substantial 
capital opening could serve to render the renminbi a less attractive carry-trade 
target. The PBOC’s widening of the permitted daily trading band from ±1 percent 
to ±2 percent in March 2014 clearly worked in this direction: the Sharpe ratio for 
the renminbi more than halved. More exchange rate risk would help tip the bal-
ance from short-term inflow pressure to medium-term outflow pressures. 
SUMMARY
In this conclusion, we recap the evidence bearing on our four hypotheses. We 
also draw implications. 
First, both the Chinese and the Indian economies are opening up. Our price evi-
dence clearly questions the relevance and usefulness of the Chinn–Ito indices of 
de jure controls. Advancing financial integration is allowing policymakers to gain 
both experience and confidence, facilitating rather than impeding an accelera-
tion of desired capital account liberalization. 
Second, we find that India is more open than China. Thus we challenge Chinn 
and Ito’s index, which suggests that China and India restrict capital flows to a 
similar extent. And we question Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s ranking of China as the 
more open economy. 7 On balance, the capital opening task is bigger for China 
than for India. 
Why has India been hitherto more financially open than China? The answer 
could lie in a mix of the need to fund current account deficits in India, the 
greater rigor with which the controls are enforced in China, the longstanding 
multinational operations of Indian private firms to arbitrage onshore and off-
shore markets (Subramanian 2009), and a larger footprint of global banks in the 
7 We hope researchers will use these measures with greater care, even skepticism, and will look for new mea-
sures. The Chinn–Ito measure in particular is not clearly fit for the purpose to which it is often put. Moreover, there 
is little reason to think that ‘the most finely gradated’ (Quinn et al. 2011, 492) measure of Schindler (2009) does 
not suffer from the same fundamental drawback. Looking at types of regulation does not reveal how restrictive 
they are, much less how restrictive they are in practice. De facto is the way to go.
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Indian domestic banking market. Future research could weigh these explana-
tions (Ma and McCauley 2013).
Whatever the cause of this longstanding difference, our evidence suggests China 
is catching up fast, meaningfully eroding India’s lead. As a policy intention, the 
paced internationalization of the renminbi has no counterpart in India. By creat-
ing a pool of renminbi bank accounts and bonds outside the Chinese mainland 
and allowing for offshore delivery of the renminbi, this policy is also punching 
holes in the capital controls through which arbitrage transactions can pass. In 
fact, the renminbi internationalization has been viewed by some as a part of the 
capital account liberalization drive in China (Zhang 2014). 
Third, an important conclusion of our study is, however, that on all three mea-
sures both the Chinese and the Indian economies have a way to go in terms of lib-
eralizing their capital accounts. Policy continues to segment onshore and offshore 
markets in both cases. More 
consistent opening move-
ments lately in China may 
support its capital account 
liberalization momentum.
Fourth, while the consensus 
medium-term prospect is 
for an increase in net private 
external assets for China, our 
findings of onshore/offshore price gaps across three important financial markets 
point to potential pressure from large inward capital flows in the event of full 
capital opening. In particular, the renminbi and money-market instruments have 
been priced cheaper onshore than offshore, while the premium of onshore share 
prices of Chinese companies had disappeared by 2013. Indeed, the renminbi was 
among the most attractive carry-trade targets until the volatility around the latest 
trading-band widening in March 2014. The full implications of this greater flexibil-
ity remain to be seen. The longer end of the renminbi yield curve could also attract 
substantial inflows with current and prospective yields. Therefore, our price gap 
evidence raises questions about the dynamics and volatility of net private capital 
flows during the process of a Chinese full capital account liberalization.
Chinese policymakers need to take into account the risks of such dynamics and 
volatility on the journey to capital account liberalization. The contrast between 
Chinese policymakers need to take into 
account the risks of such dynamics and 
volatility on the journey to capital account 
liberalization. The contrast between pos-
sible short-term net inflows and projected 
medium-term net capital outflows upon liber-
alization may amplify the potential volatility. 
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possible short-term net inflows and projected medium-term net capital outflows 
upon liberalization may amplify the potential volatility. 
Initially large inward portfolio and banking flows could interact in unpredictable 
ways with existing imbalances in the domestic financial system. Financial imbal-
ances can build up over the longer financial cycles that are not simply operating 
at business-cycle frequency (Drehmann et al. 2012). In China, the government-
sponsored investment and the credit boom of 2008–09 (which responded to the 
fallout from the boom–bust cycle in U.S. real estate) has lifted credit in China and 
raised the amount of credit in the system. Total credit to the non-financial private 
sector as a ratio to GDP, including the fast expanding shadow banking, rose by 
more than 60 percent in the wake of the GFC, from below 120 percent in 2007 
to above 180 percent in 2013. This could be a sign of increased financial vulner-
ability (Drehmann et al. 2012). 
Financial imbalances and vulnerability could trigger capital outflows in a more 
liberalized environment. The response of liberalized bank flows to a situation 
in which dollar rates remain low, Chinese rates are tending higher and the 
exchange rate expectations show stability or an appreciation bias could be siz-
able. By the same token, a clear turn in the financial cycle in China, arguably in 
its late stages already, and the prospect of big credit losses in China, in combina-
tion with normalization of U.S. dollar rates, could risk a substantial private capi-
tal outflow from China. Such net private capital outflows would fundamentally 
differ from a desired and benign increase in the net Chinese private external 
claims on the rest of the world over the medium term.
Under the circumstances, policymakers need to be concerned not only about 
the immediate money-market yield differential and its relation to exchange rate 
volatility, but also about the hard-to-predict outcome of the surge of credit in 
China. These considerations do not argue against incremental capital opening 
but at a minimum they argue for keeping a strong measurement system in place 
so that the authorities do not find themselves flying blind. 
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2. Capital Account Liberalization:  
Japan’s Experience and Implications for China
Kenji Aramaki
ABSTRACT
Japan took nearly 40 years from the 1960s to ’90s to complete liberalization 
of its capital account. Major characteristics of this process included cautious 
sequencing, use of banks as a management mechanism, and a neutral position 
for internationalization of the yen. During the process, Japan frequently had 
to use regulatory measures to cope with unstable capital flows in the 1960s to 
’70s. China has been gradually easing regulations on capital account transactions 
while maintaining overall 
regulatory framework intact. 
However, the pace of liberal-
ization has been accelerated 
after entering the 2000s, and 
this is particularly true for 
the internationalization of the 
renminbi. In light of Japan’s 
experience, three questions are raised: First, how does China intend to control 
the concomitant risk of liberalization? Instability of capital flows seems to have 
become the reality for China. Second, why does China promote internationaliza-
tion of the renminbi? Is it based on an objective assessment of economic benefit/
cost and risk or on a political judgment? Third, which does China choose between 
the stable exchange rate and free flow of capital if it cannot give up independence 
of monetary policy?
CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION IN JAPAN
Process of Capital Account Liberalization and Its Characteristics
Legislative Framework and Its Major Features 
After the end of the war, two laws, i.e., the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade 
Management Law (“Foreign Exchange Law”1949), which comprehensively man-
aged both foreign exchange and trade, and the Law Concerning Foreign Capital 
Japan took nearly 40 years from the 1960s to 
’90s to complete liberalization of its capital 
account. Major characteristics of this process 
included cautious sequencing, use of banks 
as a management mechanism and a neutral 
position for internationalization of the yen. 
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(“Foreign Capital Law”1950), which aimed at promoting inflows of high-quality 
long-term foreign capital, regulated foreign exchange and capital account trans-
actions in Japan. This regulatory framework, while placing imports under the 
approval system, had very restrictive features including:
1) A principle of general prohibition with liberalization for exceptions was 
adopted with permissions given by cabinet and ministerial ordinances or by 
specific authorization
2) The foreign exchange centralization system was adopted, under which the 
government centrally controlled all foreign currency
3) A foreign exchange budget system which regulated the amounts and items 
that could be imported was adopted
4) Authorized foreign exchange banks were used as a mechanism for controlling 
foreign-exchange and capital account transactions.
Overall Process
A three-stage liberalization (or “Liberalization in three stages”)
Substantive capital account liberalization was started in the early 1960s and 
liberalization was completed in the late 1990s, nearly 40 years later. The whole 
process may be divided into the following three stages.
1st stage: Liberalization of trade and current account transactions.
In 1960, the government adopted “the Basic Plan for Liberalization of Trade and 
Foreign Exchange,” which called for an increase in the import liberalization rate 
and the general liberalization of current-account transactions within two years. 
In 1964, Japan’s import liberalization rate reached the same level of Western 
countries. In April of that year, Japan accepted the IMF Article Ⅷ status, abol-
ished the foreign exchange budget system, and in principle liberalized current 
account transactions. 
2nd stage: Gradual liberalization and a major shift to a system of general  
liberalization.
The aforementioned basic plan showed a cautious stance on liberalization 
of capital account transactions, by simply stating “Regulations shall be eased 
gradually”. Under such a stance, transactions including foreign direct investment 
and portfolio investment were liberalized gradually from the latter half of the 
1960s. In May 1972, the foreign exchange concentration system was abolished 
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and holdings of foreign exchange by residents were liberalized. Furthermore, in 
December 1979, the Foreign Exchange Law was thoroughly revised, incorpo-
rating the Foreign Capital Law and the regulatory principle was changed from 
general prohibition to general liberalization, by, for example, shifting extensive 
transactions from under the previous approval system to under a prior notifica-
tion system.
3rd stage: Abolition of remaining restrictions and completion of capital 
account liberalization.
While the 1979 reform generally liberalized capital account transactions, certain 
transactions, such as foreign currency denominated lending between residents, 
were subject to approval. Certain other transactions, including cross-border 
issuance of securities, were subject to prior notification with examination, 
under which the transactions in question were prohibited for a pre-specified 
period and an order to change or suspend the transaction may be issued based 
on the result of examination. Furthermore, a system of emergency measures 
was instituted, under which approval requirements could be introduced for 
capital account transactions. These provisions intended to retain a regulatory 
framework for the unlikely adverse event, while committing to the principle 
of liberalization. The emergency measure was never resorted to and, in May 
1997, a number of drastic changes were made by another revision of the Foreign 
Exchange Law, including the general abolishment of the system of approval/
prior notification of capital account transactions while maintaining emergency 
measures, and the liberalization of foreign-exchange business, thus completing 
liberalization of capital account in Japan.
Through this three-stage process, all the main features of postwar regulatory 
framework mentioned earlier have been eliminated (or substantially modified): 
the foreign exchange budget system (eliminated in 1964); foreign exchange 
concentration system (eliminated in 1972); the system of general prohibition 
(eliminated by 1979 revision); and use of authorized foreign exchange banks as 
management instruments (the 1997 revision greatly reduced the management 
function of banks). 
MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF LIBERALIZATION PROCESS
The major characteristics of the process of capital account liberalization are as 
follows (Table 1).
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Cautious Sequencing of Liberalization by Type of Transactions
The sequence of liberalization by transaction type has the following features:
• Substantive liberalization of capital account transactions started after the  
liberalization of current account transactions.
• Liberalization of inward investment led to the liberalization of outward  
investment.
Table	  1:	  Sequencing	  of	  Japan's	  Liberalization	  of	  Foreign	  Exchange	  and	  Capital	  
Account	  Transactions	  
	  
	   Trade	  	   Foreign	  exchange	  and	  capital	  account	  
transaction	  
Finance	  
1940s～50s	  
Establishment	  of	  
single	  exchange	  
rate	  ($1=\360)	  	  
(Apr.	  1949)	  
	  
Complete	  
management	  of	  trade	  
by	  government	  	  
(Dec.	  1945)	  
Under	  the	  Foreign	  
exchange	  law,	  ①	  
imports	  placed	  under	  
approval	  system	  and	  
②	  foreign	  currency	  
budget	  system	  
adopted	  
	  
	  
Under	  the	  Foreign	  Exchange	  Law	  
(Dec.	  1949),	  ①	  a	  principle	  of	  general	  
prohibition	  on	  foreign	  exchange	  and	  
capital	  transactions	  with	  freedom	  as	  
exceptions,	  ②	  the	  foreign	  exchange	  
concentration	  system	  and	  ③	  the	  use	  
of	  authorized	  foreign-­‐exchange	  
banks	  as	  a	  management	  mechanism	  
adopted	  
(Control	  of	  deposit	  
interest	  rate,	  specialized	  
financial	  institutions	  
system)	  
	  
1960s	  
Accession	  to	  OECD	  
membership	  
(Apr.1964)	  
Trade	  balance	  
started	  to	  stably	  
record	  surplus	  
(from	  around	  mid-­‐
1960s)	  
	  
Cabinet	  adopts	  “the	  
Basic	  Plan	  for	  
Liberalization	  of	  
Trade	  and	  Foreign	  
Exchange”	  (Jun.	  1960)	  
(aimed	  at	  raising	  
import	  liberalization	  
rate	  (40%	  as	  of	  Apr.	  
1960)	  to	  roughly	  80%	  
within	  3	  years)	  
Import	  liberalization	  
rate	  of	  93%	  achieved	  
(Apr.	  1964)	  (level	  of	  
Western	  countries	  
reached)	  
	  
Under	  “the	  Basic	  Plan”,	  current	  
account	  transactions	  to	  be	  liberalized	  
within	  two	  years,	  and	  regulations	  to	  
be	  gradually	  eased	  on	  capital	  account	  
Liberalization	  of	  use	  of	  yen	  for	  
external	  payments	  (Jul.	  1960)	  
Introduction	  of	  non-­‐resident	  free	  yen	  
accounts	  (Jul.	  1960)	  
Japan	  moves	  to	  IMF	  Article	  Ⅷ	  
status	  (Apr.	  1964)	  
Abolishment	  of	  foreign	 exchange	  
budget	  (Apr.	  1964)	  
	  “First	  foreign	  capital	  liberalization	  
package”	  (Jun.	  1967)(start	  of	  major	  
liberalization	  of	  inward	  foreign	  
direct	  investment)	  	  
Easing	  of	  regulations	  on	  portfolio	  
investment	  in	  Japanese	  stocks	  	  
(Jul.	  1967)	  
Introduction	  of	  yen	  conversion	  limit	  
(Feb.	  1968)	  	  
Start	  of	  liberalization	  of	  outward	  
foreign	  direct	  investment	  (Oct.	  1969)	  
	  
1970s	  
"Nixon	  Shock"	  	  	  	  
(15	  Aug.	  1971)	  
Yen	  tentatively	  
moves	  to	  float	  	  	  	  	  
(27	  Aug.	  1971)	  
	  
Import	  liberalization	  
rate	  of	  95%	  achieved	  
(Apr.	  1972)	  
(import	  liberalization	  
substantively	  
completed)	  
	  
Start	  of	  liberalization	  of	  outward	  
portfolio	  investment	  in	  securities	  	  
(Apr.	  1970)	  	  
Abolishment	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  
concentration	  system	  (May	  1972)	  
	  
	  
Introduction	  of	  CDs	  
(with	  liberalized	  
interest	  rate)(May	  
1979)(start	  of	  deposit	  
interest	  rate	  
liberalization)	  
	  
Table 1: Sequencing of Japan’s Liberalization of Foreign Exchange and  
Capital Account Transactions
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• Liberalization started with direct investment and proceeded to other  
transactions.
• Some transactions, such as cross-border securities issuances, were treated 
cautiously.
Use of Foreign Exchange Banks as a Mechanism for Foreign Exchange Control
Under the Foreign Exchange Law, authorized foreign exchange banks played a 
major management role by tracking overseas transactions, and verifying their 
legal appropriateness. These functions were basically maintained even after the 
Smithsonian	  
Agreement	  	  
(18	  Dec.	  1971);	  	  
$1	  set	  to	  /308	  	  
(19	  Dec.	  1971)	  
Yen	  floated	  	  
(14	  Feb.	  1973)	  	  
First	  oil	  shock	  	  
(Oct.	  1973)	  
Second	  oil	  shock	  
(Dec.	  1978)	  
	  
Outward	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  in	  
principle	  liberalized	  (Jun.	  1972)	  
Completion	  of	  liberalization	  of	  
inward	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  
(Jun.	  1975)	  
Comprehensive	  revision	  of	  Foreign	  
Exchange	  Law	  (Dec.	  1979)(shift	  to	  
the	  principle	  of	  general	  liberalization	  
of	  capital	  account	  transactions,	  
approval/prior	  notification	  system	  
for	  certain	  transactions	  and	  
emergency	  measures	  introduced)	  
1980s	  
The	  “Yen-­‐Dollar	  
Committee”	  Report	  	  
(May	  1994)	  
The	  Plaza	  Accord	  
(Sep.	  1985)	  
	  
	  
Liberalization	  of	  euro	  yen	  lending	  
(Jun.1983~Jul.1986)	  
Elimination	  of	  Real	  demand	  rule	  
relating	  to	  forward	  exchange	  
transactions	  	  
(Apr.	  1984)	  
	  
Liberalization	  of	  external	  yen	  lending	  
(Apr.1984)	  
Elimination	  of	  yen	  conversion	  limit	  
(Jun.	  1984)	  
Permission	  of	  euro	  yen	  bond	  
issuance	  by	  non-­‐residents	  (Dec.	  
1984)	  
	  
1990s	   	  
Revision	  of	  Foreign	  Exchange	  Law	  
(May	  1997)(approval/prior	  
notification	  requirements	  in	  
principle	  eliminated,	  changed	  to	  
after-­‐the-­‐fact	  report	  system,	  
liberalization	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  
business	  (abolishment	  of	  authorized	  
foreign	  exchange	  bank	  system)	  
	  
Establishment	  of	  Law	  
Relating	  to	  the	  Reform	  
of	  the	  Financial	  System	  
(Jun.	  1992)(enables	  
banks,	  securities	  firms,	  
and	  trust	  banks	  to	  enter	  
each	  other's	  businesses	  
through	  establishment	  
of	  subsidiaries)	  	  
Completion	  of	  
liberalization	  of	  interest	  
rate	  (Oct.	  1994)	  	  
Ordinary	  banks	  allowed	  
to	  issue	  bonds	  (Oct.	  
1999)(abolishment	  of	  
separation	  system	  
between	  long-­‐term	  and	  
short-­‐term	  financial	  
institutions)	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1979 reform. The revised law also had a provision to exempt requirements of 
approval or prior notification if the transaction in question was carried out by 
authorized foreign exchange banks or designated securities firms. It was only 
after the reforms of 1997, which eliminated the authorized foreign exchange 
bank system, that the use of banks as a foreign exchange management mecha-
nism was significantly reduced. 
Neutral Stance for the Internationalization of the Yen
Regarding the internationalization of the yen, the use of yen for foreign pay-
ments, was allowed and the non-resident fee yen account was introduced in 
July 1960, at a very early stage of Japan’s liberalization process. Non-residents 
could deposit into this account not only those payments in yen they received for 
current account transactions such as importation to Japan but also those yen that 
they obtained through the sale of foreign currency to banks. By this treatment, a 
channel was opened for the first time for the inflow of short-term capital.
The internationalization of the yen progressed gradually in the 1970s, but the 
level of international use of the yen was still relatively low. The stance of govern-
ment at that time seems to be a kind of neutral one; the internationalization of 
the yen would proceed as a result of internationalization and liberalization of 
Japan’s economy and the government should not employ intentional measures 
to promote it. Behind such a stance, there might have been a concern for disrup-
tive effects of non-residents’ holdings of domestic currency on domestic finance 
and exchange rates. 
What evoked extensive debates on the internationalization of the yen was the so-
called “Yen-Dollar Committee Report” in May 1984. The U.S. argued that the yen/
dollar exchange rate issue underlying the trade imbalances between Japan and 
the U.S. was caused by the lack of appropriate valuation of the yen due to the 
closed nature of Japan’s financial and capital markets and that Japan needed to 
liberalize financial and capital markets and internationalize the yen. In relation 
to the former, Japan took a position that liberalization of financial and capital 
markets was beneficial to Japan’s economy and therefore Japan would cope with 
the issue on its own initiative. As for the latter, Japan took a position that may be 
described as a “Natural Evolution” approach under which the internationaliza-
tion of the yen was thought to proceed basically as a result of choice made by 
parties concerned in transactions, and the role of policies was to remove barriers 
to the use of the yen when parties concerned chose to use it. 
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Japan implemented measures included in the report, and the internationaliza-
tion of the yen progressed to a certain extent in the latter half of 1980s. However, 
against the background of stagnation of Japan’s economy, the international role 
of the yen stayed low or decreased in the 1990s. From 1998 onward, the govern-
ment took a position to promote the internationalization of the yen for such 
goals as enhancing competitiveness of Japan’s financial and capital markets, 
though such goals were not adequately met.
REGULATORY RESPONSE TO UNSTABLE CAPITAL FLOWS
Overview
While substantial liberalization of capital account transactions were imple-
mented from the 1960s to 1970s, the Japanese economy was exposed to 
extremely unstable capital flows against the background of major external 
shocks that took place in the international financial markets, and the govern-
ment was forced to cope with the instability. (Figure 1, p. 40)
Regulatory Response to the Instability of Capital Flows
Response to short-term capital inflows around the “Nixon Shock”: Periods 
I & II (1965–1975)
While the regulatory framework after World War II encouraged capital inflows, 
control of capital inflows became a major policy agenda in the late 1960s. 
As authorized foreign exchange banks provided one of the main channels for 
short-term capital inflows from the early 1960s, in the late 1960s regulations 
were introduced, such as requirements for foreign-currency reserves on external 
short-term debt and restrictions of outstanding balance of foreign short-term 
borrowing. In February 1968, a yen conversion limit (a type of oversold position 
limit), setting a maximum limit on the value of foreign currency assets that could 
be converted into yen, was instituted.
Despite these measures, however, there was a sudden surge in the inflow of 
short-term capital. This inflow generally took three forms: 
1) opening of free-yen accounts; 
2) purchase of public/corporate bonds by non-residents; and 
3) a massive inflow of export prepayments. 
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The government responded by introducing the maximum limit on the outstand-
ing balance of free-yen accounts, a de-facto ban on the acquisition by non-resi-
dents of certain securities and a prohibition of the conversion into yen of foreign 
currency received as prepayments.
A switch to a policy of encouraging capital inflows after the first oil shock:  
Period III (1975–79)
While most of these measures were subsequently relaxed, Japan’s balance of 
payments substantially deteriorated after the move to a float, amidst rising 
inflation caused by a policy of economic expansion, and the yen started to sig-
nificantly depreciate after the breakout of the first oil crisis in October 1973. In 
response to this development, the government changed the direction of foreign 
exchange management policy by 180 degrees from the one discouraging inflows 
to the one encouraging inflows, by, for example, significantly lowering the 
deposit reserve rate for increases in free yen account balances.
A return to a strengthening of inflow restrictions consequent to the resur-
gence of short-term capital inflows: Period IV (1979–81)
Figure 1: Japan: Short-term Capital Controls and Developments in  
Balance of Payments, Exchange Rate, and Foreign Reserves 1965-1981
Source: MOF “Balance of Payments” IMF International Financial Statistics
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Regulations were eased as Japan’s current account almost restored the balanced 
position in the latter half of 1974. However, a massive inflow of short-term capital 
resumed from October 1977 and restrictive measures on capital inflows were 
strengthened again, including imposition of a deposit reserve rate of 50 percent 
on increases in non-resident free yen accounts (increased to 100 percent in 1978).
A return to a policy of encouraging capital inflows in response to the inde-
pendent fall of the yen consequent to the second oil crisis.
Conversely, when the second oil shock occurred in 1979 and the yen indepen-
dently followed a downward path, the subsequent measures taken to encourage 
the inflow of capital included lowering the deposit reserve rate for increases in 
free-yen accounts (100 percent to 50 percent, then to 0 percent).
Subsequent Situations
Thus, from the end of the 1960s through the 1970s, the government was 
engaged in a series of policy reversals on regulations on foreign exchange and 
capital account transactions, in order to prevent the short-term capital flows 
from destabilizing the market under significant shocks. But this policy was also 
a subject of much criticism 
domestically and abroad. 
SUMMARY
The key points of Japan’s 
experience as discussed 
above include:
• Substantive capital 
accounts liberalization started in the early 1960s and liberalization was 
completed in the late 1990s, taking nearly 40 years. It proceeded through 
three stages: current account liberalization, a switch to a generally liberalized 
system, and abolition of remaining restrictions.
• With regard to the type of capital account transactions, the liberalization of 
inward investment generally preceded the liberalization of outward invest-
ment; liberalization of direct investment preceded to liberalization of other 
investment; and investments with higher risk were treated cautiously until the 
last stage of liberalization.
From the end of the 1960s through the 
1970s, the government was engaged in a 
series of policy reversals on regulations on 
foreign exchange and capital account trans-
actions, in order to prevent the short-term 
capital flows from destabilizing the market 
under significant shocks. 
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• Almost throughout the liberalization process, the authorized foreign exchange 
banks were used as an effective foreign exchange management mechanism.
• Non-resident free-yen accounts were introduced at an early stage, and later 
became one of the key channels for the short-term capital inflows. Portfolio 
securities investment and trade-related payments also became key channels 
for the short-term capital flow. 
• Regulatory measures were frequently adopted in order to manage short-term 
capital flows and seem to have had certain effects in preventing market  
instability. 
• Regarding the internationalization of the yen, while the yen settlement was 
allowed as early as 1960, and the government made efforts to remove obsta-
cles to internationalization of the yen partly in response to the request from 
the U.S., international use of the yen has not come to the level that matches 
the size of Japan’s economy.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA
Characteristics of China’s Capital Account Liberalization and Commonality  
with Japan
Around the mid-1980s, not many years after the adoption of market-opening 
reform policy in 1978, China had total state control of external transactions. Sub-
sequently, it liberalized the current account transactions in 1996, and gradually 
liberalized capital account transactions, while maintaining its overall regulatory 
framework.
In terms of the three-stage division of Japan’s liberalization process, China’s 
liberalization has passed the first stage and is now in the second stage. Regard-
ing characteristics of liberalization process, there are many commonalities, 
including the adoption of a firm gradualism, and sequencing of liberalization by 
type of transactions with inward direct investment coming first and the cautious 
treatment given to risky investment. China’s liberalization has been somewhat 
accelerated since the 2000s, but the most distinctive feature is the fact that the 
pace of liberalization regarding the internationalization of the renminbi seems to 
be faster than the pace of liberalization in other areas. 
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Implications from Japan’s Experience
(a) Control of risk
In liberalizing a capital account, the most important thing is control of concomi-
tant risk. Instability of capital flows varies depending on the type of transactions, 
and in Japan’s experience, important unstable inflow channels included capital 
flows through foreign exchange banks, purchase of securities by non-residents, 
and trade-related capital flows. The following are important considerations 
regarding risk control:
First, the effective management of unstable capital flows will be enhanced if capi-
tal transactions are conducted only through financial institutions including banks. 
Second, if such unstable capital flows are to be liberalized, thought should be 
given to whether such indirect measures as reserve ratio or foreign exchange 
position limit are sufficiently effective in managing capital flows. In the case of 
Japan, it was direct quantitative measures that finally effectively managed short-
term capital flows in turbulent periods. A decision must be made whether or not 
to maintain such quantitative regulatory tools for risky flows.
Third, consideration must be given to maintaining a regulatory system for the 
unlikely adverse events as was instituted in the 1979 reform in Japan. In this 
regard, it is noteworthy how China will handle negotiations of a bilateral invest-
ment treaty with the U.S. The U.S. insisted to the very final stage on total aban-
donment of capital transaction regulations in the negotiations with Singapore 
and Chile, and this became a major issue.
Regarding the risk control, it should be noted that, in the case of Thailand before 
and after the Asian crisis, the largest source of short-term inflows and outflows 
was “Other investment,” mainly composed of bank credit (Figure 2, p. 44).
The less affected countries in the Asian currency crisis (China, Vietnam, and 
India) had a system of quantitatively regulating foreign borrowings by banks. 
While China experienced a significant outflow of “other investment,” amounting 
to -$43.70 billion in 1998 due mainly to the outflow of trade credit, quantitative 
restriction on foreign borrowing by banks might have helped China weather the 
serious effects of the crisis. 
However, the situation may have changed for China. In 2012, China experienced 
a huge outflow of other investment amounting to $260 billion. A major part of the 
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outflow (63.1 percent) was accounted for by currency and deposits, 31.6 percent 
by loans, and only 7.5 percent by trade credits. Volatility of other investment 
flows seems to have significantly increased and abrupt reversals of these flows 
have become a real possibility for China. This will become more acute if non-res-
idents are allowed to hold and dispose the renminbi based on the change in their 
expectation regarding such factors as future renminbi exchange rate movements.
(b) Internationalization of the Renminbi
As stated before, the pace of liberalization of regulations for increasing use of the 
renminbi in international transaction seems to be faster than the pace of liberal-
ization in other areas. When promoting internationalization of the renminbi, it is 
necessary to allow holding and free disposal of the renminbi by non-residents. 
In light of Japan’s experience with the free yen account, free holding of the 
renminbi by non-residents will lead to an abrupt rise and fall of capital flows, 
significantly affect liquidity position of financial institutions and the stability of 
foreign exchange rate, and can also influence effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Furthermore, as was observed in the discussion at the time of the Yen-Dollar 
Committee, it is difficult to promote internationalization of a currency separately 
Figure 2: Thailand—Balance of Payments
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics
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from the liberalization of domestic financial and capital markets. We may note 
that liberalization of interest rate was started in 1979 and completed in 1994, 
i.e., overlapped with the third stage of capital account liberalization. Also, the 
Figure 3: China—Capital and Financial Account (1982–2012)
Source: SAFE, Chinese Government
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Figure 4: China—Breakdown of Other Investment Flows (1982-2012)
Source: SAFE, Chinese Government
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specialized financial institutions system, which included a separation between 
commercial banks and long-term credit banks, was abolished by the end of the 
1990s. Capital account liberalization means dismantling of barriers between 
liberalized overseas markets and regulated domestic markets, and therefore, 
makes liberalization of domestic markets inevitable.
The objectives of the policy of promoting internationalization of the renminbi 
need to be clearly defined. Is it for economic goals based on assessment of 
benefits/costs and risk, or for political goals such as strengthening autonomy of 
the nation?
(c) Foreign Exchange Rate Determination System
Under what is called the “Impossible Trinity” argument in international finance, 
it is not possible to achieve three goals at the same time: stability of exchange 
rate, free flow of capital, and independent monetary policy. In other words, a 
country has to choose two out of three goals. If we assume that China, as a big 
economy with its own economic cycle, cannot give up independent monetary 
policy in the same way as Japan, it has to choose either free capital flows or a 
stable exchange rate. While it may not be a choice between all or nothing and 
there may be some middle ground in between, it must be asked whether China 
is ready to modify its currently very stable exchange rate regime (classified as a 
crawl-like system by the IMF) in accordance with the schedule of capital account 
liberalization. 
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3. Latin America’s Lessons from Capital Account  
Liberalization
José Antonio Ocampo and Bilge Erten
INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1970s, Latin America has been one of the recurrent victims of 
boom-bust cycles of international finance. A significant part of that story is, of 
course, how these cycles have been managed by the region’s recipient countries. 
This includes important episodes of capital account and domestic financial 
liberalization or regulation, as well as diverging macroeconomic policies, even in 
the same country over time. From this experience, the region has accumulated 
major lessons, which have been subject to a significant debate (see, for example, 
Ffrench-Davis and Griffith-Jones 2011). 
This paper briefly analyzes the experience of Latin America in sailing through 
the choppy waters of international finance and the effects of capital account 
liberalization. It focuses on the seven largest economies (referred to here as LA7): 
Brazil and Mexico, the two largest, and Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and 
Venezuela, the mid-sized countries of the region. It is divided into four sections, 
the first of which is this introduction. The second section looks at the history of 
boom-bust cycles in international finance and the associated history of capital 
account regulations and liberalization. The third looks more carefully at the four 
episodes of capital account abundance that have taken place since the mid-
1970s. The last presents brief conclusions.
CAPITAL ACCOUNT VOLATILITY AND MANAGEMENT
Figure 1 (p. 48) presents an overview of the history of capital flows into Latin 
America over the post-WWII (World War II) period. It presents an estimate of the 
net resource transfer, defined as net capital flows minus the associated capital 
services, i.e. interest payments and profit remittances. Due to the absence of 
significant international private financing until the development of the Eurodol-
lar market in the 1960s, and the limited supply of official financing, capital flows 
to Latin America were very small until the mid-1960s. They picked up in the 
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late 1960s and early 1970s but boomed only after the first oil shock, when Latin 
America became one of the favorite destinations for the recycling of petrodollars.
Since the 1970s, the region has experienced four financial cycles.1 The first two 
were intense boom-bust cycles. The first one started in the mid-1970s and was 
interrupted by the massive sudden stop after the Mexican default of August 1982 
that unleashed the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. The major mechanism 
of financing during the boom was syndicated loans from commercial banks. The 
turnaround of the resource transfer was impressive: from a net positive transfer of 
around 2 percent of GDP during the boom to a negative one of around 6 percent 
of GDP during the debt crisis. The second one started with the effective creation 
of a market for Latin American bonds that was a by-product of the 1989 Brady 
Plan, and ended with the contagion from the East Asian financial crisis, particu-
larly after the Russian default of August 1998. The boom was interrupted tempo-
rarily by the December 1994 Mexican crisis. The turnaround of financial flows 
was slightly less dramatic than during the previous crisis: from peak resource 
transfer through financial flows of around 1-2 percent of GDP during the peak 
years to negative resource transfers of around 3.5 percent of GDP in 1999–2003. 
Furthermore, on this occasion, large FDI flows helped moderate the bust. 
1 Since the 1980s, see Bustillo and Velloso (2013).
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?Figure 1: Net Resource Transfer, 1950–2012
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Economics Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) data.
Capital Account Liberalization in China    4948   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  October 2014
In contrast to these major boom-bust cycles, the two most recent ones have 
been rather moderate in magnitude. The third cycle started in the mid-2000s 
and ended with the North-Atlantic financial crisis, particularly after the Lehman 
Brothers collapse of September 2008. The fourth took off in the second semester 
of 2009 and started to weaken with the announcement of United States’ Federal 
Reserve tapering that began in May 2013.
Like most countries in the world, the practice of Latin America during the first 
decades post-WWII was extensive foreign exchange (FX) and capital account 
controls. Among the larger countries, there were two exceptions: Mexico, which 
accepted, from the very beginning of the history of the IMF, the obligations of 
current account convertibility, and Venezuela, given its abundant oil resources. 
Figure 2 compares the strength of capital account regulations of the LA7 since 
1970 to the average of emerging market economies (EMEs), using the negative 
value of the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness.2 (The individual coun-
try indices are presented in Annex Table A.1). It shows two periods of capital 
market liberalization, which coincided with the capital account booms of the 
second half of the 1970s/early 1980s and 1992–1997. During the first of these lib-
2 See Chinn and Ito (2008). For further information, see http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm
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Figure 2: Capital Account Restrictiveness in Latin America (LA7) and EMEs
Source: Negative of Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness. http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-
Ito_website.htm
Capital Account Liberalization in China    5150   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  October 2014
eralizations, Argentina, Chile, and Peru joined Mexico and Venezuela in terms of 
capital account openness. In contrast, Brazil and Colombia remained relatively 
closed. On average, the LA7 were more closed than EMEs in the mid-1970s but 
had become more open by the early-1980s. Capital account liberalization was 
matched by domestic financial liberalization in several countries, which was 
particularly sharp in Argentina and Chile. This liberalization phase came to a 
close with the debt crisis of the 1980s, which led even the traditional liberalizers, 
Mexico and Venezuela, to close their capital accounts.
The liberalization of the 1990s was broader-based, as it also included Brazil and 
Colombia. Nonetheless, these two countries, together with Chile, developed new 
instruments to regulate capital flows: a system of taxes on capital flows in Brazil, 
and unremunerated reserve requirements (URRs) on capital inflows in Chile and 
Colombia. They were complemented with other regulations on FX transactions, 
which included restrictions on domestic financial deposits in foreign currency. In 
contrast, Argentina and Peru ended up with semi-dollarized domestic financial 
systems, a legacy of their own hyperinflations of 1989 and 1990; this was not the 
case of Brazil, which went through its own hyperinflation in the early 1990s. The 
other four countries did not experience hyperinflation3 and never ended up with 
semi-dollarized domestic financial systems. Overall, as a result of the liberal-
ization of the 1990s, Latin America came back to consistently having a more 
liberalized capital account than the average of EMEs.
In contrast with the liberalization of the 1970s/early 1980s, this one was only 
reversed in Argentina and Venezuela, in the first case as a result of the collapse 
of its convertibility system and default on its external debt in 2001–2002, which 
also eliminated the semi-dollarization of its financial system. In contrast, Chile 
further liberalized its capital account and has not used URRs since the late 
1990s, due in part to its free trade agreement (FTA) with the U.S. The dispar-
ity between countries that further liberalized and those that adopted stronger 
regulations widened during the capital account boom of 2003–2008. Based on 
the Chinn-Ito index, Brazil, Chile and Colombia further liberalized their capital 
account during the boom, as Argentina and Venezuela continued to build up 
more restrictive policies. However, Colombia again used URRs in 2007–2008; it 
is now more constrained to do so due to its recent FTA with the U.S. Peru started 
to actively regulate inflows through differential reserve requirements on depos-
its in dollars and (since 2004) short-term borrowing abroad by domestic banks 
3 Chile also underwent a period of three-digit inflation in 1973-76, Mexico in 1987–88, and Venezuela close to 
that in the late 1980s, but none of them ended up in hyperinflation. 
Capital Account Liberalization in China    5150   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  October 2014
versus deposits in the domestic currency (sol) in the financial system. Accord-
ingly, when deposits or short-term borrowing in dollars rise, authorities tend to 
increase the reserve requirements on these liabilities relative to deposits in soles, 
and the opposite when the former tend to fall. After the North-Atlantic financial 
crisis, Brazil started to use very actively its major regulatory instrument, i.e. 
taxes on capital flows.
A more detailed picture of the evolution of capital account regulations since 
the mid-1990s is provided by Figure 3, (p. 52) which shows the evolution of 
four types of regulations: (i) capital inflow restrictions, (ii) capital outflow restric-
tions, (iii) FX-related regulations, and (iv) financial sector regulations.4 The first 
two cover regulations across six asset categories: money market instruments, 
bonds, equities, financial credits, collective instruments, and direct investment. 
The third covers restrictions on lending locally in FX, on the purchase of locally 
issued securities denominated in FX, differential treatment of deposit accounts 
in FX, and limits on FX positions. The last refers to the differential treatment 
of accounts held by non-residents versus residents, limits on borrowing from 
abroad, and restrictions on maintenance of accounts abroad.
Figure 3 indicates that the most widely used instruments are FX-related regula-
tions, and more so in Latin America than in EMEs as a whole, whereas the least 
used are financial-sector regulations, where the region is below the pattern of 
EMEs. The earliest turnaround was in FX-related regulations, which started to 
be increasingly used during the late 1990s crisis. Capital inflow and outflow 
regulations had also a reversal in the downward trend during the 2000s, which 
speeded up after the North-Atlantic financial crisis. This recent rise in the use of 
capital flow regulations makes the region appear today more restrictive than the 
average of EMEs. A look at the evolution of regulations on inflows and outflows 
shows that Argentina and Venezuela have strengthened regulations significantly, 
but other countries have moved moderately in the same direction. Consequently, 
Latin America has ceased to be a region with significantly more liberal capital 
accounts (Figure 2, p. 49).
The regional story is thus rich of experience in both capital account liberaliza-
tion and regulations. The contrast is particularly sharp between Argentina and 
Venezuela, on the one hand, and Brazil and Colombia, on the other. The former 
transitioned from liberalized to very restrictive regimes, whereas the latter 
4 The first two indices were developed by Schindler (2009), and the last two by Ostry et al. (2012). We use here 
our own update of these series (Erten and Ocampo 2013).
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moved in the opposite direction. Chile is a more cyclical story, and Mexico and 
Peru have had the more liberalized regimes since the 1990s. The debt crisis of 
the 1980s was the only period of generalized regulations. 
However, although liberalization became more widespread in the 1990s, the LA7 
continued to use some form of regulation during particular conjunctures, with 
Mexico as the only exception.
LESSONS FROM CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION AND REGULATION
To draw the lessons from this diverse experience, it may be better to focus on 
the issues that have emerged during periods of abundant external financing. 
The first lesson is that liberalization during external financial booms can have 
devastating effects. Both the liberalization of the 1970s/early 1980s and of the 
1990s ended up in major crises. Largely inspired in the Latin American experi-
ence, this led in the 1980s to a literature on the “sequencing” of the liberaliza-
tion of the external sector, proposing that trade liberalization should precede 
capital account liberalization (e.g. Edwards 1984). The mix of capital account and 
domestic financial liberalization can be particularly destabilizing. The experi-
ence since the 1980s is that crises are frequently “triple”: difficulty in servicing 
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Figure 3: Capital Flow Regulations in Latin America and EMEs (index number)
Source: Updated by Erten and Ocampo (2013) with data from Schindler (2009) and Ostry et al (2012).
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the external debt, major exchange rate realignments, and domestic financial 
meltdowns. Debt crises had been the typical ones in the nineteenth century; 
“dual” crises, involving the first two, became more common since the First World 
War and, particularly, the Great Depression of the 1930s; but “triple” crises really 
made their debut in the 1980s (Bértola and Ocampo 2012, 19–22). In turn, they 
are accompanied by domestic recessions, which are mixed in several cases 
with the inflationary pressures of sharp nominal depreciations of the domestic 
currency. In the 1980s, these 
phenomena were particularly 
severe in Latin America, 
leading five countries into 
hyperinflation.
Booms in external finance 
are reflected in current account deficits, generally associated with exchange 
rate appreciation, and domestic credit expansion. Since current account deficits 
have their counterpart in domestic savings-investment imbalances, the cur-
rent account deficit would be matched by an investment boom, a consumption 
boom (a plunge in domestic savings) or a mix of them. Of course, it does matter 
what the dominant domestic imbalance is, as this has entirely different implica-
tions for future growth and the capacity to service external debts. These imbal-
ances are particularly hard to manage during liberalization periods, when there 
is “excess demand” for external liabilities that external and domestic agents 
exploit, entering into a “dance of the millions”, to use a term that became typical 
in Colombia during the external debt feast of the 1920s. Domestic authorities 
also have no or limited experience in how to handle the domestic effects of lib-
eralization. But even if they do, they may allow the “dance” to proceed, arguing, 
as the title of Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2009) well-known book indicates, that “this 
time is different”—and, of course, are pushed to do so by domestic agents who 
benefit from the boom.
The debt crisis of the 1980s in Latin America is a good example of these prob-
lems. The counterparts of the shift from zero to positive net resource transfers 
shown in Figure 1 were increased current account deficits. There were two excep-
tions: Venezuela, the most important oil exporter in the region, which actually ran 
a current account surplus during these years, and Colombia, which ran a strong 
counter-cyclical policy during the 1975–1978 coffee boom, including massive 
controls on external indebtedness, which paid handsomely during the debt crisis 
of the 1980s, as it had the lowest external debt relative to GDP in the region. 
The first lesson is that liberalization during 
external financial booms can have devas-
tating effects. Both the liberalization of the 
1970s/early 1980s and of the 1990s ended 
up in major crises. 
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The domestic counterparts of current account deficits were mostly investment 
booms (see, for the region as a whole, Figure 4), but also a plunge of domestic 
savings, particularly in Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela.5 The first two were the 
countries that experienced the sharpest domestic financial liberalization in the 
1970s, which led to the first set of massive banking crises (together with Uru-
guay). When referring to this early domestic financial liberalization in the South-
ern Cone, Diaz-Alejandro (1985) said it all in the title of one of his best-known 
papers: “Good-Bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash.” Fiscal costs 
were 55.1 percent of GDP in Argentina and 42.9 percent of GDP in Chile (Laeven 
and Valencia 2008). In Argentina it was also associated with massive monetary 
financing of the losses of the domestic financial system, leading to three-digit 
inflation during the early phase of the debt crisis.6
Open capital accounts also facilitated capital flight. Three of the countries with 
open capital accounts at the time—Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela—
experienced massive capital flight prior to and during the early phase of the debt 
crisis, which became a more important determinant of the growth of external 
5 We will not present here data on savings rates of individual countries. However, the associated data can be 
tracked down from both the ECLAC and the World Bank.
6 We should add that, as a result of its domestic financial crisis, Mexico nationalized its financial system in 1982, 
and there was also a smaller domestic financial crisis in Colombia in the early 1980s, associated with its own (more 
moderate) domestic financial liberalization. 
?
Figure 4: Latin America Investment Ratio, 1965–2013 (2000 prices/GDP)
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Economics Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) data 
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indebtedness than current account deficits (Diaz-Alejandro 1987). In Venezuela, 
increasing external debts took place despite the fact that the country actually ran 
current account surpluses prior to the debt crisis; paradoxically, before the debt 
crisis, the government actually encouraged the private sector to invest abroad 
as a way of supporting monetary contraction (Rodriguez 1985). Note, however, 
that among countries with open capital accounts, Chile actually avoided capital 
flight prior to the debt crisis thanks to high domestic interest rates and rapid asset 
appreciation. Peru also did, but largely because it was already facing problems 
prior to the debt crises, and had actually renegotiated its external debt in 1978.
During the liberalization of the 1990s, current account deficits were an impor-
tant part of the story, but were now accompanied with very weak investment 
recoveries (see Figure 4). Econometric estimates indicate that increased external 
financing led to significant reductions in domestic savings, feeding consump-
tion booms (Uthoff and Titelman 1998). Saving declines were particularly severe 
in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. Domestic financial meltdowns 
occurred in all LA7 except Chile and Peru, and were particularly severe during 
the 1994 banking crises of Mexico and Venezuela, where fiscal costs reached 
19.3 and 15.0 percent of GDP (Laeven and Valencia 2008).
The capital account boom of 2003–08 had entirely different effects. Five fac-
tors explain this result. First, for the first time the region as a whole ran current 
account surpluses. Second, in contrast to the previous capital surge, investment 
boomed (Figure 4). The mix of current account surpluses and rising investment 
indicate that domestic savings rates actually increased in Latin America during 
this boom. Third, the period of external abundance was used to both reduce 
external debts and accumulate FX reserves. As Figure 5 (p. 56) indicates, the 
external debt net of reserves fell from 27.9 percent of GDP in 2002 to 5.5 percent 
of GDP in 2008. The accumulation of reserves reflects the fact that most LA7 
countries moved during the crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s into man-
aged floating; this is not true of Venezuela and is only partly correct of Chile, 
which rather uses fiscal stabilization funds as its major mechanism of interven-
tions in FX markets. Fourth, debt reduction was achieved by a mix of stronger 
fiscal accounts, the development of domestic bond markets for government 
securities, and the debt renegotiation of Argentina in 2005 and 2010. Finally, 
prudential regulation strengthened as a result of past domestic financial crises.
Better management of the boom contributed to the fact that the North American 
financial crisis had moderate effects on Latin America. Although the initial reces-
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sion or slowdown was strong in all countries (notably in Mexico and Venezuela), 
there were no major balance of payments or domestic financial crises. Nonethe-
less, this should be read with two caveats. 
First, improvements in current accounts were essentially the result of boom-
ing terms of trade. All countries benefitted from the commodity price boom 
that took off in 2004, notably Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, which are 
dominantly oil or mineral exporters. Figure 6 indicates that, when the effects of 
improving terms of trade are netted out, there was a sharp deterioration of the 
current account to levels that by 2008 were significantly higher than prior to the 
previous crisis for the region. Thus, the current account surpluses were not the 
result of prudent balance of payments or aggregate demand policies. Rather, 
Latin America essentially spent—and, indeed, by 2008 started to overspend—its 
booming commodity foreign exchange revenues. 
The second caveat is that developed countries adopted massive market inter-
ventions to stabilize financial markets, which generated a new boom of financ-
ing toward EMEs since mid-2009. Massive support to Mexico after its December 
1994 crisis had generated a similar effect in blocking contagion to other Latin 
American economies and shortening the crisis duration.
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Figure 5: External Debt as % of GDP at 2000 Parity Exchange Rates
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Economics Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) data 
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The renewal of external financing in recent years has had more mixed effects 
than the previous surge. Now, despite still booming terms of trade, the region has 
again started to run current account deficits. This generates risks if commodity 
prices fall. However, the major current risks are those faced by Venezuela and, to 
a lesser extent, Argentina, the two countries that have adopted stronger capital 
account regulations. This illustrates an important final point. Capital account 
regulations can be effective, particularly in improving external debt profiles, 
supporting countercyclical monetary policies during booms, mitigating reces-
sionary pressures during sudden stops in external financing and, with somewhat 
mixed evidence, avoiding exchange rate appreciation (Ostry et al. 2012; Erten 
and Ocampo 2013). However, such regulations should be used as a complement 
to and not a substitute for counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. When the 
latter happens, the positive effects of regulations can be defeated by the distor-
tions generated by massive black market exchange rate market premiums and/
or multiple exchange rates, including the incentives for the private sector to 
circumvent regulations.
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Figure 6: Current Account Balance Adjusted by Terms of Trade (% of GDP)
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Economics Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) data 
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CONCLUSIONS
The rich history of Latin America with strong cycles in external financing and 
current account liberalization teaches important lessons. The most important is 
that surges in international capital markets generate significant pressure to adopt 
pro-cyclical macroeconomic management and temptation to liberalize capital 
account and financial regulations. When countries adopt pro-cyclical policies 
and fall to these temptations, crises generally follow. This is the experience of 
Latin America following the capital account booms of the mid-1970s/early 1980s 
and 1992–97.
Not all booms necessarily end up in crises. The critical issues are current account 
deficits and associated currency appreciation. In contrast, reduction of external 
debts and accumulation of FX reserves serve as an important bulwark against 
capital account volatility, as reflected in the reduced sensitivity of Latin America 
during the recent crisis. The domestic counterpart of the current account deficit 
is also important. The experience of the Southern Cone during the first boom 
and of a broader group of countries during the second was particularly problem-
atic as the additional external financing was consumed rather than invested.
Maintaining some tools to directly manage capital account volatility is crucial. 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru have used some of these tools productively at 
different times during the past quarter century. This means that capital account 
regulations offer an opportunity to support counter-cyclical policies and thus 
help macroeconomic authorities to “sail against the wind.” However, when 
capital account regulations are used as a substitute for such counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies, crises cannot be avoided, and may in fact become 
more severe.
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Annex Table A.1: Capital Account Restrictiveness in Latin America
	  
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Venezuela
1970 -­‐0.68 1.86 1.86 1.86 -­‐2.44 0.81 -­‐0.51
1971 1.07 1.86 1.86 1.86 -­‐2.44 1.07 -­‐1.21
1972 1.34 1.86 1.86 1.86 -­‐2.44 1.34 -­‐1.21
1973 1.6 1.86 1.86 1.86 -­‐2.44 1.6 -­‐1.21
1974 1.86 1.86 1.86 1.86 -­‐2.44 1.86 -­‐1.21
1975 1.86 1.86 1.86 1.86 -­‐2.44 1.86 -­‐0.51
1976 1.86 1.86 0.81 1.86 -­‐2.44 1.86 -­‐1.74
1977 0.11 1.86 0.11 1.86 -­‐2.44 1.86 -­‐1.74
1978 0.11 1.86 0.11 1.86 -­‐2.44 0.54 -­‐1.74
1979 0.11 1.86 0.11 1.86 -­‐2.44 0.28 -­‐1.74
1980 0.11 1.86 0.11 1.86 -­‐2.44 0.02 -­‐1.74
1981 0.11 1.86 0.11 1.86 -­‐2.44 -­‐0.25 -­‐1.74
1982 1.17 1.86 1.86 1.86 0.81 -­‐0.51 -­‐1.74
1983 1.17 1.86 1.86 1.86 1.07 -­‐0.51 0.55
1984 1.17 1.86 1.86 1.86 1.34 0.81 0.81
1985 1.17 1.86 1.86 1.86 1.6 1.07 1.07
1986 1.17 1.86 1.86 1.86 1.86 1.34 1.34
1987 1.17 1.86 1.86 1.86 0.81 1.6 1.6
1988 1.17 1.86 1.86 1.86 0.81 1.86 0.81
1989 1.17 1.86 1.86 1.86 0.81 1.86 0.81
1990 1.17 1.86 1.86 1.17 0.81 1.86 0.11
1991 1.17 1.86 1.86 1.17 0.11 1.17 0.11
1992 1.17 1.86 1.86 1.17 0.11 -­‐1.12 0.11
1993 -­‐1.38 1.86 1.86 1.86 -­‐1.12 -­‐1.38 1.17
1994 -­‐1.65 1.86 1.86 1.86 -­‐1.12 -­‐1.65 1.17
1995 -­‐1.91 1.86 -­‐0.43 1.86 -­‐1.12 -­‐1.91 1.17
1996 -­‐1.12 1.86 1.86 1.17 -­‐1.12 -­‐1.12 -­‐0.15
1997 -­‐2.18 1.86 1.86 1.17 -­‐1.12 -­‐2.44 -­‐1.65
1998 -­‐1.91 1.17 1.86 1.17 -­‐1.12 -­‐2.44 -­‐1.91
1999 -­‐1.65 1.17 1.17 1.17 -­‐1.12 -­‐2.44 -­‐2.18
2000 -­‐1.38 1.17 1.17 1.17 -­‐1.12 -­‐2.44 -­‐2.44
2001 1.17 1.17 -­‐1.38 1.17 -­‐1.12 -­‐2.44 -­‐2.44
2002 1.17 0.11 -­‐1.65 1.17 -­‐0.06 -­‐2.44 0.11
2003 0.11 0.11 -­‐1.91 1.17 -­‐0.06 -­‐2.44 0.11
2004 0.11 0.11 -­‐2.18 0.11 -­‐1.12 -­‐2.44 0.11
2005 0.11 -­‐0.15 -­‐2.44 0.11 -­‐1.12 -­‐2.44 0.11
2006 0.81 -­‐0.41 -­‐2.44 0.11 -­‐1.12 -­‐2.44 1.07
2007 0.81 -­‐0.41 -­‐2.44 0.11 -­‐1.12 -­‐2.44 1.07
2008 0.81 -­‐0.41 -­‐2.18 -­‐1.12 -­‐1.12 -­‐2.44 1.34
2009 0.81 -­‐0.41 -­‐1.91 0.11 -­‐1.12 -­‐2.44 1.6
2010 0.81 -­‐0.15 -­‐1.65 0.11 -­‐1.12 -­‐2.44 1.86
2011 0.81 0.11 -­‐1.38 0.11 -­‐1.12 -­‐2.44 1.86
2012 n.a. n.a. 1.17 1.17 n.a. n.a. n.a.
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4. Careful with the Carry Trade:  
Lessons from Eastern Europe
Daniela Gabor
INTRODUCTION
Eastern Europe provides an interesting entry point to consider how capital 
account (KA) liberalization affects emerging countries and to draw lessons for 
China. First, formerly planned economies liberalized because of political objec-
tives to join international organizations, either OECD or the European Union 
(Arvai 2005). Second, Eastern Europe (EE) has long been terrain for carry-trade 
games that are now at the center of global debates on China (BofAML 2014), 
carry trades driven by global banks present in their financial systems. Third, 
pre-Lehman wisdom stressed the positive effects of liberalization: Eastern Euro-
pean countries had “to learn to live with large capital inflows” to achieve rapid 
convergence, including financial deepening (Arvai 2005). Yet the region suffered 
severely when global banks began deleveraging after Lehman. 
This chapter stresses three lessons: 
1) the actors and cross-border relationships that give rise to capital flows should 
be considered carefully, particularly where driven by carry trades; 
2) liberalization underpins the financialization of currency markets (financial 
trading, mostly offshore) that in turn financializes interbank money markets 
(structural excess of liquidity, asymmetrically distributed) and thus complicates 
the conduct of monetary policy; and 
3) in light of 1) and 2), the IMF’s new institutional view on capital flows manage-
ment should be re-thought to fully normalize capital controls.
DRAWING PARALLELS
In early 2014, financial analysts and scholars agreed on two sources of turbu-
lence in emerging market economies (EME) linked to quantitative easing, and 
tapering, in the U.S. and Europe. First, asset managers in core countries had 
increased appetite for EME local currency debt (Farolli et al. 2014). Non-residents’ 
holdings of EME local currency bonds doubled from 12.7 percent in 2008 to 
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26.6 percent in 2012, as EME local currency debt nearly doubled to $9.1 trillion 
between 2008 and 2012 (Turner 2013). Second, EME banks and non-financial 
corporations started to tap international dollar funding markets, embarking on 
an international leverage binge, yet another carry trade, the third in 20 years 
(BofAML 2014;1; Shin 2013; Turner 2014). Driven by global banks, the second 
carry ended in 2008, with damaging consequences for Eastern Europe. In the 
third carry, China accounted for half of the $855 billion borrowed from interna-
tional banks, and 10 percent of the USD1.04 trillion in bonds issued. 
Recent scholarship has categorized the forms and risks of carry trades. Carry 
trades entail borrowing in low-interest (funding) currencies to invest in high-
yielding (target) currencies (Galati et al 2007). Narrow carries involve a directional 
currency bet, while in broad carries investors hold assets denominated in the tar-
get currency (bonds, stocks, bank deposits—see Hattori and Shin 2007, UNCTAD 
2007). (Non)financial domestic actors engage in carries by borrowing abroad or 
by issuing foreign currency bonds, then brought onshore to purchase high-yield-
ing instruments or deposit with 
banks (Turner 2014). 
In turn, non-resident investors 
(eg. asset managers) that want 
to hold EME local currency 
assets often need resident 
banks to “intermediate” carries. Resident banks lend them domestic liquidity 
through spot/derivative markets, often off-balance sheet, or on-balance sheet 
overnight credit. The onshore presence of global banks increases the scope 
for carry trades, since subsidiaries can fund proprietary trades through parent 
banks—internal capital markets—and engage offshore/onshore with non-resident 
investors (Gabor 2014). 
In pursuit of yield differentials, carry-traders create currency mismatches and 
sharpen pro-cyclical effects on EME credit and asset markets (Turner 2014). 
Carry-trades reverse rapidly when funding conditions change, with systemic 
implications for target countries (Kaltenbrunner 2010; Ferolli et al., 2014; Turner 
2014; Shin 2013). Old “trilemmas” become obsolete as central banks faced with 
global financial cycles must choose between independent monetary policy and 
capital controls (Rey 2013; also Gallagher et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, carry trades financialize the markets traders rely on. McCauley and 
Scatigna (2011) observed that activities in high-yielding currency markets are 
In pursuit of yield differentials, carry-
traders create currency mismatches 
and sharpen pro-cyclical effects on EME 
credit and asset markets.
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increasingly driven by financial motives rather than international trade, with the 
bulk of trading offshore in key financial centers. 
A BRIEF EASTERN EUROPEAN CONTEXT
Emerging Europe liberalized capital accounts in two broad waves. Early liber-
alizers (Baltic states, Czech Republic) removed most controls by 1997; in turn, 
Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia by 2004, and Romania and 
Bulgaria by 2006 (Arvai 2005). Countries shared the sequencing: first FDIs, more 
cautious on interest-rate sensitive inflows, in particular non-resident access to 
short-term funding instruments and local currency asset markets. FDIs were 
important in bank privatization (see Table 1). 
Before Lehman, this close embrace of financial globalization appeared to deliver 
on its promises. A few tense episodes aside (speculative attacks in 1997 in the 
Czech Republic, 1999 in Romania, 2003 in Hungary), EE countries grew rapidly 
(above 5 percent on average), running large current account deficits—except 
Czech Republic and Poland—funded by large capital inflows, increasingly domi-
nated by interest-sensitive flows (see Figure 1, p. 64).
Despite diverse exchange rate regimes (Poland and the Czech Republic target-
ing inflation with full floats, Romania and Hungary with managed floats1; Baltic 
states and Bulgaria pegged to the euro), foreign reserves increased across the 
region before Lehman (see Figure 2, p. 65). Central banks resorted to direct 
currency market interventions (Romania, Hungary, Czech Republic) or absorbed 
foreign revenues from privatization and/or international debt issuance (Poland, 
Czech Republic). Although the theoretical consensus stressed that the systematic 
currency appreciation across the region was a welcome indicator of real con-
vergence and a reward for strong fundamentals (Arvai 2005), in practice central 
banks sought to contain the exchange rate impact of large capital inflows.
These concerns were somewhat vindicated in the global financial crisis. Exchange 
rates and foreign reserves (see Figure 2) fell rapidly as portfolio investors left and 
1  Hungary moved to a full float in February 2008.
Table	  1:	  Foreign	  Bank	  Share	  in	  Banking	  Assets,	  Eastern	  Europe	  
 
 Bulgaria Cz. Rep Hungary Poland Romania Lithuania Estonia Slovenia 
2004 72 84 65 72 78 91 90 20 
2009 79 80 64 68 92 91 91 21 
Source:	  Bankscope	  
le 1: Foreign Bank Share of Banking Assets, Eastern Europe
Source: Bankscope 
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Western banks threatened to leave. Several countries (Romania, Hungary, and 
Latvia) turned to the IMF, while home, host regulators and parent banks initiated 
ad-hoc consultations (the Vienna Initiative) on how to maintain Western banks’ 
exposure to the region. Except for Poland, capital outflows and lower demand 
for exports translated into a “hard landing,” with an average 8.5 percent regional 
contraction in 2009 and a 0.18 percent growth in 2010, well below Latin America 
(-1.8 percent and 6.3 percent respectively) or East Asia (-0.9 percent and 8.4 
percent respectively). Capital flows returned after quantitative easing (QE) in high-
income countries, through portfolio flows rather than cross-border banking flows 
(see Figure 1), consistent with Shin’s (2013) observations about the second phase 
of global liquidity, driven by asset managers rather than global banks.
Lesson 1: The actors and cross-border relationships that give rise to capital flows 
should be considered carefully.
In Eastern Europe, capital account liberalization was accompanied by the sys-
temic foreign presence of Western European banks. This incorporated EE coun-
tries in global financial architectures, actively intermediating capital inflows to 
support both “traditional” (relationship) lending and carry-trades activities. After 
Lehman, highly interconnected, highly leveraged transnational banks acted as 
conduits for global financial tensions.
Throughout the early 2000s, parent banks increased exposure to subsidiaries 
and non-financial corporations across the region, particularly to Baltic states, 
Romania and Hungary, (see Figures 3 and 4, p. 66–67). Western European banks 
built a $1.3 trillion exposure to EE countries, with Austrian banks accounting 
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Figure 1: Net Financial Flows (USD bn), Eastern Europe
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook 
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for 20 percent, Italian banks for 17 percent, and German banks for 15 percent2. 
Once Lehman collapsed, parent banks contemplated withdrawing funding from 
EE subsidiaries, a disorderly exit regardless of country-level fundamentals (Pistor 
2010). While parent banks eventually agreed, through the Vienna Initiative, to 
roll-over short-term funding lines to subsidiaries, their commitment varied, with 
substantial outflows from Baltic countries and Hungary (see Figure 3). 
Cross-border borrowing from banks funded three distinctive carry-trade strate-
gies: corporate borrowing, resident banks’ intra-financial system activity, and 
foreign currency loans to 
households.
Familiar to observers of 
Chinese corporations (Shin 
2013), external borrowing by 
resident non-financial corpo-
rations played an important 
role. Resident banks sent 
EE corporations to borrow 
directly from parent company, thus circumventing regulatory attempts to restrict 
credit growth (Pistor 2010; Kudrna and Gabor 2013). For instance, Romanian 
companies borrowed abroad around EUR 17.4bn between 2006 and 2008, a 
2  Such competitive pressures pushed domestic-owned banks to follow suit; before Lehman, Latvian-owned 
banks raised 60% of short-term funding from non-residents. 
In Eastern Europe, capital account liberal-
ization was accompanied by the systemic 
foreign presence of Western European 
banks. This incorporated EE countries in 
global financial architectures, actively inter-
mediating capital inflows to support both 
“traditional” (relationship) lending and carry-
trades activities. 
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Figure 2: Foreign Reserves, CEE Countries, 1990–2013
Source: IMF and Joint External Debt Hub 
Note: Poland (PL RHS) is shown separately on left axis because its foreign reserves are on a much 
larger scale than all the other countries.
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third of outstanding cross-border bank loans. Such forex borrowing could have 
supported real economic activity (hedging forex exposures, invest overseas) or 
be used to re-invest locally at higher rates.
Resident banks also engaged in carry games. Christensen (2004) first noted the 
“sterilization games” played by Czech banks as the country lifted capital controls 
throughout 1995–1996. Relevant for China’s choice of exchange rate regimes, 
resident Czech banks borrowed abroad short-term to test the central bank’s 
currency peg. Banks exchanged forex loans in the currency market, placing 
the local liquidity thus obtained in high-yielding, low-risk sterilizations. For 
two years, the central bank sterilized around USD5bn (40 percent of its foreign 
reserves), wishing to avoid nominal appreciation that threatened the trade 
balance and simultaneously meet money supply targets. It abandoned the peg 
in early 1996, and faced a speculative attack in May 1997. A similar scenario 
involving resident banks unfolded in Romania in late 1998, even though the 
country was only initiating its KA liberalization process (Gabor 2010). 
Ever since, sterilization games have taken place across Eastern Europe (Balogh 
2009; Gabor 2010). Easier to show for Romania, claims on the central bank there 
amounted to around 30 percent of resident banks’ domestic assets throughout 
the early 2000s, declining as banks increased their household lending portfo-
lios (see Figures 5 to 8, p. 68–69). Resident Czech banks held in sterilization 
operations the equivalent of their portfolio of government debt. Both Polish and 
Figure 3: Cross-Border Loans from BIS Banks, % of GDP
Source: IMF and Joint External Debt Hub 
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Hungarian resident banks engaged in sterilization operations, increasingly large 
after Lehman. Furthermore, foreign borrowing supported intra-financial system 
activity throughout the region, a sign of increased interconnectedness and lever-
age (Shin 2013). In contrast, local lending to corporates—the traditional business 
of banking—rarely went above 40 percent of total assets, figures consistent with 
the market-based business models of Western European banks (Haldane 2009).
Resident banks pursued another (broadly defined) carry trade: using parent or for-
eign market funding to extend foreign currency loans to households in countries 
with high local interest rates. By September 2008, banks in Latvia, Estonia, Lithu-
ania, Hungary, and Romania had over half of the rapidly growing household loans 
denominated in euros or Swiss francs. Borrowers accepted the exchange rate 
risk where banks offered attractive lending rates, below those in local currency, 
and because common wisdom—akin to that on U.S. house prices—suggested that 
local currencies would continue to appreciate (the Balasssa Samuleson effect). 
Without capital controls, prudential measures were easily circumvented through, 
for example, loan externalization. Since Lehman’s collapse, this has resulted in 
increasingly significant non-performing loans (and a political battle between Hun-
gary and its resident banks to renegotiate forex mortgage loans).
Well-known dangers materialized quickly in Eastern Europe post-Lehman: capital 
outflows inflicting devaluations that threatened financial stability given currency 
mismatches, then internal devaluations to improve external competitiveness. 
Interconnected banking further complicated cross-border coordination of crisis 
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Figure 4: Interbank Cross-Border Loans 
Source: IMF and Joint External Debt Hub
Capital Account Liberalization in China    6968   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  October 2014
management and macroprudential policies, since host regulators worried that 
restrictions on parent banks (by demanding local funding of local assets) would 
ignite outflows from subsidiaries. Indeed, central banks across the region vocally 
opposed attempts from the Austrian central bank to impose tighter loan-to-value 
ratios on Austrian subsidiaries (Kudrna and Gabor 2013).
Furthermore, KA liberalization saw the entry of new systemic actors: non-
resident investors. Other emerging countries view non-resident interest as a 
Figure 5: Poland, Domestic Bank Assets
Source: Central Bank 
Figure 6: Hungary, Domestic Bank Assets 
Source: Central Bank
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mixed blessing: improving the liquidity of domestic asset markets, but poten-
tially in a pro-cyclical fashion (Shin 2013). Whereas several EME countries (eg. 
Figure 7: Romania, Domestic Bank Assets 
Source: Central Bank
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Figure 8: Czech Rep., Domestic Bank Assets (CZK bn) 
Source: Central Bank
Note: for the Czech Republic (figure 8), the central bank provides separate data for its sterilization 
activities in its annual reports, but not as a distinctive item on the banking sector’s balance sheet. 
Average sterilization volumes (black bars) were included to capture the magnitude of sterilization 
relative to bank assets.
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Peru, Thailand, Ukraine) imposed controls on non-resident holdings of local 
currency assets, countries with EU membership (ambitions) could not. Intra-
region variations depended on depth of (domestic) debt markets. Thus, Hungary 
and Poland were attractive to non-residents before 2008 (see Figures 9 and 10). 
Romania’s small sovereign debt market and sterilizations through borrowing 
(rather than issuing debt) translated into relatively small non-resident hold-
ings. After Lehman, unwinding carries affected Hungary and Romania severely, 
illustrating well Shin’s (2013) warning that EMEs reliant on non-resident inflows 
might come under severe stress when global monetary conditions tighten. While 
EE countries increased reliance on non-residents after 2009, their central banks 
took steps to strengthen management of volatile capital flows. Since 2012, the 
Czech Republic and Poland returned to currency interventions, while Hungary 
and Romania cut interest rates aggressively (by 500 basis points (bp) in Hungary 
and 300 bp in Romania). How effective these measures will be when (if?) U.S. and 
Europe (ECB and Bank of England) tighten remains to be seen.
Lesson 2: Capital inflows lead to financialized currency and interbank money 
markets, posing difficult dilemmas for central banks during sudden stops.
Recent BIS Triennial Surveys detail the financialization cum internationalization 
of EE currencies, with 70 percent of trading occurring offshore through OTC 
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Figure 9: Non-Resident Holdings of Debt Securities, 2001–2012
Source: Joint External Debt Hub
Note: Black column represents 2007 values.
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derivatives with short-term maturity. The EE experience further highlights that 
currency markets do not financialize in isolation but spill over into interbank 
money markets, affecting banks that fund assets locally.
In traditional banking, the interbank money market allows banks with fund-
ing gaps (from loan activity) to borrow from banks with excess reserves (from 
deposit taking). Central banks inject liquidity to meet the deficit of reserves and 
keep the interbank interest rate close to policy rates. Yet when central banks 
intervene in currency markets to manage capital inflows, it is currency interven-
tions that create and distribute (asymmetrically) domestic liquidity. Banks with 
access to foreign borrowing create domestic liquidity by intermediating capital 
inflows, funding the carries described above. The policy rate no longer deter-
mines funding costs for these financialized banks, while central banks’ energy is 
spent on mopping excess reserves from interbank money markets (Gabor 2012). 
This sterilization predicament is familiar to the Chinese central bank. Its strategy 
has been to use reserve requirements (Ma et al. 2011) rather than short-term 
sterilization instruments in Eastern Europe. The fundamental difference, at least 
before Chinese non-financial corporations and banks turned to carry trades, 
has been that China’s sterilizations reflected foreign reserve accumulation from 
trade surpluses. In Eastern Europe, market-based sterilizations offered another 
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Figure 10: Non-Resident Holdings of Debt Securities as a Share of Foreign 
Reserves, 2001–2012 
Source: Joint External Debt Hub
Note: Black column represents 2007 values.
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asset class for resident banks engaged in carry games, perversely attracting 
further inflows.
The EE lesson is that the financialization of interbank money markets can be 
damaging for “patient” (relationship-based) banks because episodes of large 
outflows also play out in the interbank money market. The typical response to 
sudden stops is to raise interest rates and defend the currency through foreign 
reserve sales that squeeze domestic liquidity. If the central bank re-injects that 
liquidity into money markets, it becomes the unwitting (ultimate) counterparty 
of short-sellers. Yet by doing nothing, it tightens interbank liquidity, and thus 
confronts reserve-deficient banks with high interbank rates. Consider Roma-
nia’s experience in 1998, then still with capital controls and state-owned banks 
(institutionally similar to China). Confronted with a sudden stop after the Russian 
crisis, the central bank sold foreign reserves, without sterilizing the impact on 
money markets. The ensuing liquidity shortages and rocketing interest rates (see 
Figure 11) punished state-owned and private domestic banks, eventually trig-
gering a banking crisis (Gabor 2010). Similar events unfolded across East Asia in 
1997 (IMF 1997). 
After Lehman, EE countries faced similar challenges to ensure that non-specula-
tive domestic demand for liquidity would be satisfied at “normal” market rates. 
Several countries ring-fenced resident banks’ assets (Poland, Croatia, and Turkey, 
see Cerutti et al. 2010) or imposed restrictions on resident banks’ transactions 
with non-residents (Latvia and Romania, see Buiter and Sibert 2008; Gabor 
2012). Indeed, the IMF now agrees that countries can target non-residents with 
capital controls and/or split interbank markets since “restrictions on non-resident 
access to funding in local currency can at times make currency speculation more 
difficult” (IMF 2013, 18). 
Lesson 3: The IMF’s new institutional view on capital controls is ineffective to 
manage cross-border financial linkages. 
The global financial crisis led the IMF to reconsider its long-standing rejec-
tion of capital controls. Its new institutional view encourages capital controls 
(see IMF 2013), albeit not before countries undertake possible macroeconomic 
adjustments (exchange rates to equilibrium, lower interest rates, sterilized cur-
rency interventions and fiscal tightening). If China plans to rely on this macro-
first approach in its strategy of liberalization/reminibi internationalization, it 
should consider carefully the extent to which macroeconomic policies can 
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constrain cross-border financial linkages (particularly the carry trade strategies 
described above). 
The answer from Emerging Europe is ambiguous. Once money markets become 
financialized through currency interventions, resident banks can choose 
whether to place the liquidity obtained on currency markets in sterilization 
games, in market portfolios, or to lend it to non-residents. Sterilization games, 
the IMF’s own research shows (see Christensen 2004), may prepare the terrain 
for speculative attacks, as in the Czech Republic.
The institutional incentives at play make it difficult to constrain cross-border 
linkages for banks through macroprudential policies. Both central banks and 
governments benefit from capital inflows, the former because capital inflows 
appreciate the domestic currency and keep import prices low, the latter because 
demand for sovereign debt increases market liquidity and reduces sovereign 
yields. The difficulty lies in recognizing that these benefits are cyclical. When 
central banks do so, they can exclude banks altogether from sterilization opera-
tions, change the maturity of sterilizations (to long-term operations), or impose 
capital controls that reduce the necessity and scale of currency interventions.
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Figure 11: Interbank Money Market Volumes (LHS) and Rates (RHS),  
Romania, 1997–1999
Source: Central Bank of Romania (http://www.bnro.ro/Raport-statistic-606.aspx) 
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Structural banking reforms are also important. The IMF has recognized the 
“destabilizing . . . floods and draughts” of cross-border banking and proposed, in 
a Staff Position Paper (IMF 2011), two measures to mitigate its systemic implica-
tions. Regulators could either fragment internal capital markets, curbing the free 
movement of liquidity across banking groups, or restrict resident banks’ bor-
rowing in international interbank markets. Such measures would enact a local 
banking model reliant on domestic sources of funding. 
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5. Should China Accelerate Capital Account  
Liberalization Now?
Ming Zhang
INTRODUCTION
After the U.S. subprime crisis, the cross-border capital flows in China have 
become larger and more volatile. In 2009, People’s Bank of China (PBOC) pro-
posed a timetable to accelerate capital account liberalization in 2012, and fully 
open the capital account by 2020. This essay argues against PBOC’s proposal, 
and provides seven critiques of it. Instead of speeding up capital account open-
ness, the Chinese government should consider accelerating the RMB exchange 
rate and interest rate liberalization, pushing forward domestic financial market 
reform, implementing domestic structural adjustment, and participating in inter-
national cooperation to coordinate capital flow management.
NEW PLAN TO ACCELERATE CHINA’S CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION
China’s current account was liberalized in 1996. The Chinese government began 
to open its capital account in 1994, but the process was interrupted by Southeast 
Asia’s financial crisis in 1997–1998. Since then, a gradual and cautious way has 
been adopted to open China’s capital account (Zhang 2012, 2013). By early 2012, 
according to the 40 sub-items of capital account transactions defined by IMF, 
there were 14 basically convertible, 22 partly convertible and 4 not convertible 
in China (PBOC 2012a). Among various capital flows, direct investment and trade 
finance are mainly liberalized; portfolio investment is under quota controls like 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) and Qualified Domestic Institu-
tional Investors (QDII); and money market plus financial derivative transactions 
are under strict controls.
China’s balance of payments has been facing some prominent changes since the 
U.S. subprime crisis (Figure 1, p.78): First, the current account balance declined 
due to sluggish external demand and fast RMB appreciation, but the capital 
account balance rose as the result of advanced economies’ QE and China’s capi-
tal account openness; consequently, the capital account balance took the place of 
current account balance as the major resource of foreign exchange reserve accu-
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mulation. Second, the volatilities of both current and capital account balances 
increased significantly after the crisis. As shown in Figure 2, among China’s capi-
tal account transactions, direct investment has been relatively stable, portfolio 
investment has been small and more volatile, while the other investment flow 
(short-term bonds and derivatives) has been the largest and most volatile.
PBOC published two reports in 2012 suggesting that China should speed up its 
capital account liberalization (PBOC 2012a, 2012b). PBOC (2012a) argued that the 
time was right to accelerate opening the capital account. The major arguments 
included: First, the breakout of the global financial crisis offered China a window 
of time to encourage outward investment because western companies were 
valued at low levels; second, capital account liberalization could promote not 
only the use of RMB in international trade and investment but also the develop-
ment of offshore RMB markets; third, since China’s capital account controls were 
increasingly ineffective, it made more sense to open the capital account; fourth, 
the potential risks of capital account liberalization were offset by China’s stable 
financial system, huge foreign exchange reserve, and low foreign debt; fifth, 
capital account openness could push forward a domestic structural adjustment.
PBOC (2012b) further pointed out that, on the one hand, both Mundell’s Impos-
sible Trinity and Interest Rate Parity had some limitations; on the other hand, 
international experiences showed that there were no fixed sequencing among 
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Figure 1: China’s Quarterly Balance of Payments
Source: CEIC Data
Capital Account Liberalization in China    7978   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  October 2014
interest rate reform, exchange rate reform, and capital account liberalization. 
Therefore, RMB interest rate reform, RMB exchange rate reform, and capital 
account liberalization should be pushed forward in concert. In other words, the 
Chinese government need not follow any specific policy sequencing to liberalize 
the capital account.
Based on the above arguments, PBOC (2012a) put forward a new time table 
for capital account opening: In the short term (one to three years), the direct 
investment controls should be loosened to encourage the going out of domestic 
enterprises; in the middle term (three to five years), the commercial borrowing 
and lending controls should be loosened to facilitate RMB internationalization; 
in the long term (five to ten years), the transactions of real estates, stocks, and 
bonds should be liberalized, and quantity-based capital control tools should 
be replaced by price-based ones. Moreover, according to some market rumors, 
PBOC made a more radical two-step liberalization proposal to top leaders in 
2013, which suggested liberalizing the capital account by 2015, and completely 
liberalizing it by 2020. Furthermore, as stated in the decisive document pro-
duced by the 3rd plenum of the 18th Communist Party of China Central Commit-
tee, RMB’s convertibility under the capital account should be accelerated (CPC 
Central Committee 2013). Finally, the operation of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone 
would materially promote capital account openness.
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Figure 2: Breakdown of China’s Quarterly Capital Account
Source: CEIC Data
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In 2012 and 2013, there was heated debate in academic and policy-making 
circles about whether China should accelerate the liberalization of its capital 
account. PBOC argued for it, and some scholars, including myself, argued 
against it. It should be noted that, after this debate, it seems that PBOC officials 
have softened their stance on capital account liberalization. For example, in an 
internal speech made by PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan, he emphasized the 
importance of monitoring and regulating short-term capital flows, even after the 
capital account has been fully liberalized.
CRITIQUES ON THE PROPOSAL OF RAPID CAPITAL ACCOUNT  
LIBERALIZATION
Whether China should accelerate capital account liberalization at the current 
stage was the hottest policy debate in domestic political and academic circles 
in 2013. As mentioned above, PBOC argued for it, but some scholars, including 
my colleagues and me, argued against it (Yu et al. 2013). Our major critiques of 
PBOC’s new plan are as follows:
First, there is huge uncertainty about whether capital account liberalization 
could promote domestic structural reform. One of the most powerful arguments 
presented by PBOC is that capital account liberalization could push forward 
internal structural adjustments. In fact, PBOC’s officials are market-oriented and 
want to pursue domestic reforms further, but they realized that it would be very 
difficult to deepen the reforms now because of resistance from vested interest 
groups. Therefore, PBOC’s officials want to use capital account liberalization as 
an external commitment device to force domestic structural reform.
However, we really doubt whether this commitment device could work. Three 
very important structural reforms are needed to sustain future economic growth: 
income redistribution across households, government, and corporate sectors; 
breaking the state-owned enterprises’ (SOE) monopoly on the service sector; 
and the liberalization of domestic factor prices. Without a doubt, capital account 
openness could promote the liberalization of RMB’s exchange rate and interest 
rate, but we suspect whether it could push forward structural reforms such as 
income redistribution from government and corporate sector to household sec-
tor, or opening service sector to private companies.
Furthermore, if the Chinese government does speed up capital account liberal-
ization, and if this effort triggers some financial crisis, the domestic structural 
reforms would very likely be suspended or even reversed after the crisis. 
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Second, using capital account liberalization to promote RMB internationalization 
is merely a tautology. Capital account liberalization and RMB internationalization 
are two sides of the same coin. PBOC began to promote RMB internationalization 
in 2009 precisely because it wanted to advance capital account liberalization. 
Because Chinese top leaders would understand the significances of RMB inter-
nationalization much better than those of capital account liberalization, PBOC 
adopted the following strategy deliberately: First, use RMB internationalization 
as a disguise to push capital account liberalization; second, use the need for 
further RMB internationalization as an excuse to push for more capital account 
liberalization (Yu 2013).
International experiences 
show that currency interna-
tionalization is the result of 
natural market choices, not 
the result of government initiatives (McCauley 2011). Our field investigation and 
data analysis shows that the seemingly fast development of both RMB settlement 
in cross-border trade and offshore RMB market so far could be largely attrib-
uted to RMB exchange rate and interest rate arbitraging between onshore and 
offshore markets (Zhang and He 2012). We argue that at the current stage, both 
RMB internationalization and capital account liberalization should not become 
the top of priorities on the Chinese government’s agenda.
Third, the tail risk of accelerated capital account liberalization might be too huge 
for the Chinese economy to bear. Capital controls are a cornerstone of China’s 
financial repression, which channels funds from households to corporations 
and government. Chinese households have been suffering a heavy implicit 
tax by assuming persistent negative real deposit interest rate, and thus have 
strong incentives to diversify their assets abroad if capital account controls are 
removed. Compared with the 3.8 trillion USD foreign exchange reserve, Chinese 
household savings is over 40 trillion RMB. If Chinese households initiate a mas-
sive capital outflow (always being accompanied by foreign investors), it would 
be very difficult for PBC to stabilize the RMB exchange rate, even if using the 
foreign exchange reserve. The resulting RMB depreciation would induce more 
capital outflow, thus forming a vicious cycle.
The existing financial fragilities will exacerbate the tail risk of rapid capital 
account liberalization. In the past several years, the shadow banking system is 
burgeoning as the result of Chinese commercial banks’ collective effort to cir-
We argue that at the current stage, both RMB 
internationalization and capital account lib-
eralization should not become the top of pri-
orities on the Chinese government’s agenda. 
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cumvent regulation and hedge off macro policy uncertainties. Although the bal-
ance sheets of commercial banks still seem healthy, vast maturity mismatches, 
yields mismatches, and other risks are hiding in off-balance sheet transactions 
such as wealth management products, bank trust cooperation, interbank bor-
rowing and lending, etc. If there is a massive capital outflow resulting from 
capital account liberalization, the related interest rate hikes would pierce the 
shadow banking bubble and cause a painful financial crisis. In March 2014, a 
Chinese private company in solar energy industry (Chaori Solar) defaulted on 
the payment of interest of its corporate bond, which was the first default event 
in the Chinese corporate market in the past 20 years. In the near future, the 
market expects that there will be a series of defaulting in corporate bonds and 
trust products, which would push down the confidence on the domestic financial 
regime, and increase the risk of huge capital outflow if the capital account has 
been liberalized.
Fourth, the efficacy of China’s capital account control has been declining, but it 
is still effective on the whole. More importantly, the Chinese government could 
strengthen the effectiveness of capital account control as it wishes. According 
to numerous sources, although there are some leakages, China’s capital account 
control is still binding. The evidence includes the persistent and significant RMB 
interest rate and exchange rate spreads between onshore and offshore markets, 
and the large transaction costs of cross-border capital movements (Ma and 
McCauley 2008; Otani et al. 2011). In addition, the export growth in Q1 2013 was 
remarkably high because there were a lot of cross-border interest rate arbitrag-
ing activities under the guise of goods export. To deal with this, PBC and SAFE 
issued some new regulatory measures to identify and penalize the arbitrag-
ing activities. As a result of this effort, the export growth in Q2 2013 declined 
dramatically. This case shows that the Chinese government could improve the 
efficacy of capital controls if it wanted to do so.
Ironically, PBOC’s efforts to push RMB internationalization significantly weak-
ens the efficacy of capital account control. A two-track capital control regime 
was established in China after 2009. The capital flows denominated in USD are 
under the relatively tight regulation of State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE), but the capital flows denominated in RMB are under the very loose regu-
lation of local subsidiaries of Monetary Policy Department II under PBC. Thus the 
two-track regime creates a new space for regulatory arbitraging: if any resident 
or non-resident wants to move funds across the border, he would first transfer 
funds from USD to RMB. This arbitraging space also shows that if PBC wants to 
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strengthen capital control, it can achieve the objective by regulating more heav-
ily on RMB denominating capital flows.
Fifth, it is bad timing now for China to accelerate capital account liberalization. 
The U.S. subprime crisis and European sovereign debt crisis did push down the 
valuation of western companies. However, thanks to the collective QE performed 
by advanced economies, the stock price index in developed economies reached 
new record highs, meaning the western companies are not cheap anymore. 
Additionally, China’s outward direct investment faces an awkward dilemma: 
SOEs could get sufficient financial support from domestic banks but suffer from 
large suspicion and resistance from host countries; however, private companies 
facing less external resistances find it difficult to obtain financing assistance or 
even approval domestically. 
From a domestic perspective, as the result of persistent high investment and 
weak external/internal demand, excess capacity will continue. This will result 
in a new NPL wave for commercial banks and reduce confidence in domestic 
financial health. From external perspective, the Federal Reserve in the U.S. 
would exit from its policy of quantitative easing and raise interest rates in the 
near future, increasing external attractiveness. Combining these two possibilities, 
if China’s capital account is open, the most possible scenario would be a massive 
and destructive surge in capital outflows.
Sixth, China’s capital account liberalization should follow appropriate policy 
sequencing, fulfilling at least three preconditions: liberalizing the RMB exchange 
rate and interest rate, and further reforming the domestic financial market. Even 
with a largely effective capital control, China still faced significant cross-border 
arbitraging flows in the past several years. The roots of arbitraging activities lie 
in the exchange rate intervention and interest rate regulation by PBC, which 
creates significant exchange rate and interest rate spreads between onshore 
and offshore markets. If the Chinese government liberalizes the capital account 
before liberalization of the RMB exchange rate and interest rate, there would 
be larger and more volatile arbitraging flows, leading to undesirable boom-bust 
cycles of both asset prices and inflation. 
The Chinese government should also speed up financial market reform before 
fully opening the capital account. Otani et al. (2011) suggest that capital account 
liberalization should be accompanied by a strong and stable domestic financial 
market, especially with a deep and liquid secondary market for financial assets. 
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Cappiello and Ferrucci (2008) argue that if domestic financial liberalization has 
not been effectively implemented, then capital account liberalization would only 
provide excessive arbitraging opportunities. Kose et al. (2006) argue that capital 
account liberalization could stimulate economic growth only in those economies 
in which domestic financial markets reached certain thresholds. Thus, the Chi-
nese government has at least two urgent tasks for the domestic financial market: 
first, opening the financial market to domestic private capital as soon as pos-
sible; second, adopting comprehensive macro-prudential policies to control the 
existing financial fragilities, especially in the shadow banking system.
Seventh, the new international 
trend forming after the global 
financial crisis is a preference 
for proper capital flow manage-
ment as opposed to fast capital 
account liberalization. During 
or after the current financial 
crisis, some emerging econo-
mies such as Brazil and South Korea, which had already liberalized their capital 
accounts, chose to re-introduce certain capital flow management measures to 
deal with the increasingly volatile cross-border capital flows. In addition, even the 
IMF—the former trumpeter of free international capital flows—changed its tune 
and suggested that capital flow management could enter the tool kit of emerging 
market economies along with macroeconomic policies and macro-prudential 
regulations for those countries to combat volatile capital flows (Ostry et al. 2011).
China is no different from other emerging economies. One of the most impor-
tant reasons why China could escape unscathed from both the Southeast Asian 
financial crisis and current global financial crisis is precisely that China has not 
opened its capital account. Chinese officials, especially those in PBOC, should 
abandon their over-confidence and complacency, show more respect to other 
emerging economies’ experiences of capital account liberalization, and pay more 
attention to the new international trend regarding capital flow management.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
To summarize, the PBOC’s proposals should be cautious to accelerate capi-
tal account liberalization now. China’s capital account should continue to be 
liberalized in a gradual, cautious, and controllable way. At the same time, the 
One of the most important reasons why 
China could escape unscathed from both 
the Southeast Asian financial crisis and 
current global financial crisis is precisely 
that China has not opened its capital 
account.
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Chinese government should overcome various difficulties and promote the 
following reforms:
RMB exchange rate should be liberalized as soon as possible. PBOC should 
decrease the intervention on the daily middle price of the RMB against the 
USD, and let it be determined by market demand and supply. China’s current 
account balance to GDP shows that the current RMB exchange rate is very near 
to the equilibrium level. However, if PBOC continues to intervene on the foreign 
exchange market, the RMB exchange rate might change from an undervalued 
position to an overvalued position. The risk of an overvalued domestic currency 
is much higher than that of an undervalued one, because currency over-valu-
ation would trigger capital outflow much more easily. Since March 17th 2014, 
PBOC expanded the daily fluctuation band of the exchange rate of RMB against 
USD from ±1 percent to ± 2 percent, which was a positive step for the further 
liberalization of RMB exchange rate.
RMB interest rate liberalization should be accelerated with some matched 
reforms. Now the key issue of RMB interest rate reform is when and how to lib-
eralize the benchmark deposit interest rate, which is critical for the transition to 
a different economic model. However, interest rate liberalization might introduce 
new risks. The Chinese government should promote the following two comple-
mentary reforms to facilitate interest rate liberalization: first, a national deposit 
insurance company should be established to allow the bankruptcy and liquida-
tion of domestic financial institutions; second, a comprehensive and effective 
macro-prudential regulatory regime should be built to avoid the asset bubbles 
that often follow interest rate liberalization. In March 2014, PBOC governor Zhou 
Xiaochuan stated that the deposit interest rate would be liberalized in the next 
one or two years, which showed that PBOC is determined to accelerate interest 
rate liberalization.
Domestic financial market reforms should be pushed forward in time. The 
establishment of private commercial banks and other private financial institu-
tions should be welcomed. Some high-risk shadow banking products should be 
allowed to default to divide clearly the responsibilities of the parties involved, 
and to avoid exacerbating moral hazards. The off-balance sheet transactions 
should be disclosed more transparently and completely. Chinese financial 
institutions, especially commercial banks, should start deleveraging process, 
accumulate more capital, and prepare enough NPL provisions.
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Domestic structural adjustments should be pushed forward in spite of strong 
resistance from vested interest groups. More national income should be redis-
tributed from government and corporate sectors to the household sector, which 
means that the government should cut the tax burden of households, and SOEs 
should pay more dividends to the government to fill the gap in the social secu-
rity account. The SOEs’ monopoly in many service sectors such as telecommuni-
cations, transportation, finance, education, and medical care should be broken, 
and private companies should be welcomed to enter those sectors. Domestic 
factor prices, including the prices for energy and land should be liberalized as 
soon as possible. No doubt the above structural reforms would be very difficult 
because of resistance from vested interest groups. However, it is the time to face 
up to them and tackle them now, because the Chinese economy cannot afford 
further delay of these important structural reforms.
The Chinese government should actively participate in the international coop-
eration to coordinate capital flow management efforts. In a financially globalized 
world, not only the domestic monetary policy but also cross-border capital flow 
management measures adopted by large economies could have negative spill-
over effects. China should join in the international coordination on cross-border 
capital flow monitoring, early warning, and regulation, which could not only 
increase the effectiveness of capital flow management, but also improve China’s 
image as a responsible major player in the global financial community.
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6. Capital Account Liberalization in China:  
Some Considerations
Vivek Arora and Franziska Ohnsorge
INTRODUCTION
Capital flows have increased significantly in recent years and are a key aspect of 
the global economy. In China, for example, capital flows have increased substan-
tially since 1994, when FDI began to be increasingly liberalized. Now other parts 
of the capital account are being gradually liberalized as the Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (QFII) and Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) 
initiatives are being expanded, and other plans are moving forward with the 
March 2013 National People’s Congress envisaging an eventual goal of full capital 
account liberalization and the Third Plenum decision in November 2013 laying 
out a broad strategy. 
In the rest of the world as 
well, capital flows are sizable. 
Advanced economies account 
for the bulk of gross capital 
flows, although their share in 
the total has fallen from 90 
percent in the years before 
the global financial crisis to approximately 75 percent in recent years. Emerg-
ing and developing economies account for a correspondingly smaller share of 
global capital flows, but their share has risen sharply—from less than 10 percent 
before the crisis to 25 percent more recently. Moreover, net capital flows as a 
share of GDP are larger on average in emerging and developing economies than 
in advanced ones. 
At the same time that China is embarking on a new phase of capital flow liber-
alization, the issue of cross-border capital flows is receiving increased attention 
in policy discussions worldwide at both the multilateral and bilateral levels. It is 
recognized that capital flows offer potential benefits to countries, but that their 
size and volatility can also pose risks and challenges. Because capital flows 
have a bearing on economic and financial stability both in individual economies 
Because capital flows have a bearing on 
economic and financial stability both in indi-
vidual economies and globally, an important 
challenge for policymakers is to develop a 
coherent approach for handling them. 
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and globally, an important challenge for policymakers is to develop a coherent 
approach for handling them. Some progress has been made toward this end in 
recent years, including the G20’s 2011 “Coherent Conclusions for the Manage-
ment of Capital Flows.” And a number of bilateral and multilateral international 
agreements establish norms and rules applicable to their members with respect 
to capital flows. However, no comprehensive global approach has existed for the 
liberalization and management of capital flows. 
The IMF’s “institutional view” on the liberalization and management of capital 
flows is part of the effort to fill this gap (IMF 2012a, 2013). The institutional view 
builds upon a body of policy and research papers based on theoretical and 
empirical analysis and country experience. It proposes some broad principles 
for the liberalization of long-standing restrictions on capital flows and for the 
management of temporary surges of capital inflows and of disruptive capital 
outflows. It considers the circumstances under which capital flow management 
measures (CFMs), which are measures designed to limit capital flows, are appro-
priate. The view will guide Fund advice to members but does not alter their 
rights and obligations to the Fund or under other international agreements. The 
view is expected to evolve in light of new experience, research, and feedback 
from country authorities and others. Aspects of the view may be relevant for 
China at this important stage in China’s reforms.
China’s renewed focus on capital account liberalization has rekindled research 
on the implications of China’s liberalization for the rest of the world.1 Bayoumi 
and Ohnsorge (2013) estimate possible effects of capital account liberalization 
on global cross-border portfolio exposures and He and others (2012) exam-
ine possible effects on global foreign direct investment and portfolio capital 
flows. Both papers predict substantial portfolio capital outflows if China lifts its 
remaining capital controls. Hooley (2013) speculates about the ramifications of 
China’s capital account liberalization for global financial stability and, more spe-
cifically, for London as a financial center. He highlights the benefits of greater 
diversification of risk but also greater vulnerabilities to shocks originating in 
China as global exposures to Chinese assets and liabilities grow. 
1 A large literature exists on how various aspects of China’s development affect the rest of the world. For 
example, Arora and Vamvakidis (2011) analyze the spillover effects of China’s economic growth on other countries 
and Arora, Tong, and Constantinescu (2013) discuss China’s economic integration with South Asia.
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BENEFITS AND RISKS OF CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION 
Capital flows can have substantial benefits for countries, including by enhancing 
efficiency, promoting financial sector competitiveness, and facilitating produc-
tive investment and consumption smoothing. An important “collateral” benefit 
Figure 1: Capital Flows to Advanced Economies
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, World Economic Outlook
Figure 2: Capital Flows to Emerging Markets
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, World Economic Outlook
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of openness is that, as countries develop, they need more advanced financial 
systems; and more advanced financial systems generally go hand-in-hand 
with more open capital flows. This benefit may explain the ongoing preference 
among many countries for further liberalization of capital flows.2
At the same time, capital flows carry risks. The global financial crisis has shown 
that even countries that have long been open and drawn benefits from capital 
flows can be vulnerable to these risks, which are magnified by gaps in their 
financial and institutional infrastructure. Capital flow liberalization is gener-
ally more beneficial and less risky if countries have reached certain levels or 
“thresholds” of financial and institutional development. These thresholds relate 
to factors such as income and growth, macroeconomic stability and cushions, 
and governance and the business environment. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Three main policy implications are discussed here. 
First, there is no presumption that full liberalization is appropriate for all 
countries at all times. The extent of liberalization that is appropriate for a given 
country at a given time depends on its particular circumstances, especially its 
financial system and institutions. 
Second, countries with long-standing restrictions would likely benefit from more 
liberalization. Many emerging economies, for example, have well-established 
track records of growth and macroeconomic stability, ample foreign reserves, 
and low debt. For them, the benefits of some further capital flow liberalization 
may be high relative to the costs of prevailing restrictions. In this regard, China’s 
intentions to further open capital flows goes in the right direction. 
Third, in countries that are moving forward with capital flow liberalization, liber-
alization needs to be well planned, timed, and sequenced in order to ensure that 
its benefits outweigh the risks.
Currently preferred is an “integrated approach” to liberalization that envisages 
achieving the pre-conditions for safe liberalization and proceeding through 
successive phases, which can, however, overlap. The sequencing of the various 
items of the capital account that are opened up is first FDI inflows, then FDI 
outflows and long-term portfolio flows, and finally short-term portfolio flows. 
2 In light of the “impossible trinity,” more liberal capital flows must involve less autonomy with respect to either 
monetary policy or the exchange rate.
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Liberalization needs to be supported by reforms to the legal, financial, and 
corporate frameworks and development of financial markets. If countries find 
that they have liberalized too fast, in the sense that they are unable to handle the 
resulting volume of capital flows, then it is appropriate temporarily to re-impose 
capital flow management measures until the supporting reforms are put in place.
CHINA’S APPROACH IN CONTEXT
China’s capital account reform strategy has followed in many respects the 
approach sketched out above. First, FDI was opened up, particularly since 1994, 
and then, over the last decade or so, portfolio flows have been gradually liberal-
ized through schemes including the QDII and QFII. Measures have included an 
expansion in both the size and the range of instruments allowed under these 
schemes. At the same time, China has made substantial progress with setting in 
place the financial and other supporting reforms that are needed for mediating 
cross-border capital flows. In parallel, China has been moving to internationalize 
the renminbi, a move that would both be supported by more open capital flows 
and itself contribute to more open flows.
Although China has gradually been opening its capital account, it remains 
restricted in many respects as a number of capital flows are subject to approval 
requirement or quotas. Specifically (IMF, 2012b): 
Foreign Direct Investment. In several areas, inward FDI and its liquidation 
remain subject to approval requirements. Restrictions in strategic sectors are in 
principle not unusual; however, some argue that the range of restricted sectors is 
broader than elsewhere. 
Portfolio investment is controlled by quotas. Inward investment is channeled 
through Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII), subject to a three-month 
lock-in period for most shares, and an aggregate ceiling that has successively 
been raised since 2002. The QFII scheme introduced in 2011 allows qualified 
firms to invest offshore renminbi back into China, subject to an overall ceiling. 
Outward portfolio investment—for foreign securities purchased by residents—is 
channeled through Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII), subject to 
institution-specific ceilings. When the QDII scheme was introduced in 2006, it 
only allowed residents to invest in the foreign money market and fixed-income 
markets through institutional investors; since then, the scheme’s scope has been 
gradually expanded. Cross-border issuance of securities requires approval. 
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Other investment. Foreign borrowing is subject to a ceiling (for short-term bor-
rowing) or approval requirements (for long-term borrowing), but lending abroad 
is largely unrestricted. The holding of cross-border accounts requires approval. 
For many purposes, individuals are allowed to freely transfer abroad $50,000 
per year. Real estate purchases abroad by resident individuals are allowed, as is 
the repatriation of proceeds from real estate sales in China by non-residents. 
Whether as a result of incremental easing of controls or despite remaining 
controls, capital flows have been substantial. Gross FDI flows over the decade to 
2012 were the fifth largest in the world after the U.S., the UK, Austria and Lux-
embourg. “Other” investment flows—which include the buildup or drawdown of 
foreign currency deposits at domestic banks—have been similar in size to those 
in some fully liberalized countries. Foreign currency deposits, especially, have 
tended to fluctuate as state-owned enterprises have adjusted their profit repatria-
tion in response to their expectations of how the exchange rate may change. In 
addition to these officially recorded capital flows, some capital flows may also 
pass through the current account, although it is difficult to estimate their extent. 
Only the category of heavily restricted portfolio flows remains small by peer 
group standards. 
At the same time as gradually lifting some of its capital controls, China has made 
progress with setting in place the financial and other supporting reforms that 
are needed for mediating cross-border capital flows. In parallel, China’s moves 
to internationalize the renminbi would go hand-in-hand with more open capital 
?
Figure 3: Capital Flows, Average 2005–2010 (% of GDP)
Source: Haver Analytics; IMF IFS; staff estimates 
Note: Shades of gray reflect the quartile of absolute values in each row, with dark gray indicating 
the lowest quartile and light gray indicating the highest quartile. Data for Australia, Russia, and 
Malaysia based on BPM6. For all others based on BPM5.
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flows. Despite these efforts, Lardy and Douglass (2011) argue that the necessary 
preconditions for capital account liberalization—in their view, a strong banking 
system, developed financial markets, and an equilibrium exchange rate—are not 
yet in place. 
In the past three years, the authorities have reaffirmed their intention to proceed 
with capital account liberalization. In the 12th Five-Year Plan issued in October 
2010, they pledged to “gradually realize convertibility of the capital account.” 
The Third Plenum Decision of November 2013 similarly pledged to accelerate 
capital account opening by gradually improving the convertibility of cross-bor-
der capital and financial transactions and establishing foreign debt and capital 
flow management under a macro prudential framework. The new Shanghai Free 
Trade Zone provides an opportunity to experiment with capital account liberal-
ization in a closely monitored pilot program.
IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S CAPITAL FLOW LIBERALIZATION:  
FOR CHINA AND FOR THE WORLD
A further opening of China’s capital account would be a logical step in China’s 
economic transformation. Given China’s size and importance in the global 
economy, a further opening of its capital account would likely have implications 
not only for China but for the world. Several recent papers have explored pos-
sible implications. 
Bayoumi and Ohnsorge (2013) and He et al. (2012) estimate the possible effect of 
China lifting its capital controls on portfolio capital stocks and flows:3 
• Capital account opening in China will likely be followed by substantial gross 
portfolio flows as global and domestic portfolio holdings adjust. 
• During the adjustment period there may be net outflows from both equity and 
bond markets as domestic investors seek to diversify large domestic savings. 
This is in contrast to what would be expected if, say, India opened its capital 
account. 
• Such net outflows of portfolio investment could dampen pressures for reserve 
accumulation from net FDI or other investment inflows or current account 
surpluses for several years to come. 
3 There are several caveats to the analysis, of which we highlight two. First, these are partial equilibrium esti-
mates, holding constant all factors other than capital account liberalization. Second, stock adjustments could well 
be phased over several years, muting their global impact, as capital flows are liberalized gradually. 
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Large gross inflows and outflows could generate significant movements in 
global asset prices. For example, Benelli (2011) examines what would happen if 
private portfolio capital outflows as a result of capital account liberalization were 
invested in emerging markets and these outflows were accumulated by drawing 
down reserves. He estimates a $500 billion (some seven percent of China’s 2011 
GDP) shift out of U.S. public debt into emerging market government debt could 
increase U.S. bond yields by 60 basis points and reduce emerging market bond 
yields by 240 basis points. Bayoumi and Ohnsorge’s (2013) and He et al.’s (2012) 
results suggest the effects could be even larger. 
Hooley (2013) explores the implications for global financial stability of such a 
“hard-wiring” of China into the global financial system. In addition to changing 
global asset prices, Chinese capital account liberalization would boost the inter-
national use of the RMB and increase the size of offshore markets that trade the 
RMB, including London (see also Craig et al, 2013). “RMB internationalization” as 
well as a greater presence of Chinese investors and borrowers in global financial 
markets would render the global financial system more closely integrated to 
China’s financial system, which renders benefits but also increases the propen-
sity for the transmission of shocks. 
By opening up alternative 
investment opportunities for 
savings and risk diversification 
into foreign products, further 
capital account liberaliza-
tion in China could also have 
implications for Chinese financial markets (Hooley, 2013). At the same time, it 
could pose risks to domestic financial stability that would need to be monitored 
closely. Interest rate regulation continues to depress returns on bank deposits, 
which have offered negative real returns since 2003. Lardy and Douglass (2011) 
argue that capital account liberalization would force banks to raise deposit rates, 
with negative effects on bank profits. Currently, alternative instruments for 
household savings are the stock market, “wealth management products,” and 
the property market. If households gained access to global financial markets, 
liquidity in these three domestic financial markets could shrink. 
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, drawing on the Fund’s institutional view, some key points with 
respect to capital account liberalization are as follows. The institutional view 
A cautious sequencing of liberalizing 
measures in all three areas (capital 
account, financial sector, and exchange 
rate) is needed.
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is intended to provide input for our policy advice. It does not alter countries’ 
rights and obligations to the Fund or under other international agreements. With 
respect to capital flow liberalization, the benefits are greatest when financial and 
institutional development is adequate and macroeconomic conditions strong. 
There is no presumption that full liberalization is appropriate for all countries at 
all times, but countries with long-standing restrictions would benefit from more 
liberalization. Liberalization should be well-planned, timed, and sequenced.
China’s moves to liberalize its capital account are welcome and appropriate. 
The removal of long-standing capital controls could bring substantial economic 
benefits. However, distortions remain in the rapidly growing financial sector and 
the exchange rate remains managed. Hence, a cautious sequencing of liberal-
izing measures in all three areas (capital account, financial sector, and exchange 
rate) is needed.
China’s capital account liberalization may have implications for other countries. 
Gross capital outflows from China may increase as a result of Chinese sav-
ings seeking to diversify abroad, and inflows may rise as global investors seek 
exposure to China’s growth potential. There will be benefits from increased risk 
diversification as China’s financial system integrates into the world’s, but there 
will also be the potential for greater transmission of shocks in both directions. 
Greater capital account liberalization in China can have important benefits for 
China and the world, and a carefully planned and implemented approach is 
appropriate for maximizing the benefits and minimizing the risks.
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7. Capital Account Liberalization in China:  
Learning Lessons 
Jan Kregel
THE PARADOX
Economic deregulation and liberalization have been the external policy recom-
mendations of choice for two very different sets of problems facing developing 
economies in very different geographical locations. First, as structural adjust-
ment embodied in the 
Washington Consensus, dereg-
ulation and liberalization have 
been proposed as the solution 
to failed domestic industrial-
ization strategies, generally 
in the Southern Hemisphere, 
characterized by low growth, 
external and fiscal deficits, exchange rate instability, and hyper-inflation. At the 
same time, the same measures have been proposed as a remedy for the exces-
sively successful policies in Asia characterized by high savings and investment 
rates, high growth, external and fiscal surpluses, exchange rate stability, and 
price stability. 
Liberalization is the preferred solution to crisis and to success; thus the paradox 
of how the same policies, in particular relating to liberalization of the external 
capital account, can provide the remedy for two very different types of eco-
nomic dysfunction. Indeed, one might wonder why any remedy is needed for 
excessively successful economic performance, and, in particular, to what extent 
the absence of liberalization has been the source of the success (or failure) of 
economic performance.
Two answers are proposed to this paradox. The first is that the combination of 
deregulation and liberalization is not, in fact, recommended as a remedy for the 
performance of the developing countries in which it is applied, but rather it is 
a solution for the problems facing developed countries, usually represented in 
the form of unsustainable global imbalances. It is instructive that these policies 
Liberalization is the preferred solution to  
crisis and to success; thus the paradox of 
how the same policies, in particular relat-
ing to liberalization of the external capital 
account, can provide the remedy for two 
very different types of economic dysfunction. 
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are always imposed either by direct bilateral pressure of developed countries 
on developing countries (in the case of Asia) or via the pressure of multilateral 
financial institutions under the influence of developed countries (in the case of 
South America). 
The second proposed answer to the paradox is the error of misplaced con-
creteness in the assessment of policy, or what is often called the “frame” of the 
discussion. In general, the frame is to consider as normal a deregulated, liberal-
ized market system, and to mistake that system as a means to an end instead of 
being the end in and of itself. Thus, policies are formulated to achieve open mar-
kets, rather than designing more open conditions in order to achieve domestic 
policy objectives such as income growth, equality, or employment. 
This chapter will start by considering the second explanation of framing, noting 
in particular that the failure to understand the operation of the market system 
being recommended makes policy recommendations difficult and frequently 
results in the operation of the law of unintended consequences. It then discusses 
how these policies have been applied to the second category of “successful” 
countries, generally Asian as noted above, highlighting how the policies have 
produced the exact opposite of the anticipated results because of the framing 
error. China appears to be in the category of countries that have managed to be 
excessively successful and, from the point of view of the developed countries, 
generated substantial global imbalances that are perceived to have damaged the 
economic performance of developed countries. Thus, China is facing both inter-
nal and external pressure to apply policy designed to open domestic financial 
markets similar to that applied to Japan and Korea.
FRAMING
Virtually all policies that recommend liberalization start from two prior assump-
tions: first, that a formal market can exist, and second, that there are the appro-
priate number of market agents with profit maximizing objectives to produce 
a self-adjusting mechanism capable of producing more efficient, “equilibrium” 
outcomes. Liberalization reduces distortions or impediments to the operation of 
this ideal process. However, in most cases neither of these prior conditions are 
satisfied, and instead of analyzing the objectives to be achieved by instruments 
of policy, the instruments themselves—free markets—become the objectives to 
be achieved. The advice given by multilateral financial institutions to developing 
countries showcases this error.
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This type of error is most common in two areas: labor and capital markets, where 
it is not even clear what is being traded, much less whether such “markets” could 
in fact exist, let alone function effectively. And in both cases, the presumed opera-
tion of a self-equilibrating process clearly does not exist. Keynes made the case 
for the labor market in his General Theory, through the simple observation that 
the supply and demand functions are not independent of conditions in the rest 
of the economy. An excess supply of labor that drives down wages and reduces 
household incomes is supposed to increase profits and investment financing; but 
instead, the fall in sales will decrease labor requirements to produce the lower 
level of sales and increase excess capacity, reducing the incentive to higher invest-
ment. The market mechanism in this case is self-reinforcing or cumulative, rather 
than self-adjusting. But the problem is not so much the failure of the operation of 
the adjustment mechanism as it is the failure to understand that the labor market 
does not determine the level of employment.
Finance provides the other area. When interest rates are not free to adjust to 
equilibrium, financial repression is said to exist. On the presumption that low 
savings in developing countries impedes capital investment and higher growth, 
the proposed solution was for these countries to liberalize domestic interest 
rates and to “borrow” the savings of developed countries in international capital 
markets. Liberalization of global capital markets would then allow capital to flow 
from developed countries with high capital intensity production and low rates of 
return to be invested in capital poor, high rate of return developing countries.
Here the problem is that it is impossible to identify rates of return to capital. 
While the Cambridge controversies made it clear that there is no such thing as 
“capital” that is allocated in a market by comparison of rates return, they also 
made it clear that there is no specific positive or negative correlation between 
capital and its return. 
Despite these difficulties in identifying just exactly what is involved in the lib-
eralization of capital markets, either domestically or globally, the International 
Monetary Fund has continued to support this instrument as an objective via its 
1990s recommendations to amend its Articles of Agreement to abrogate Article 
6 and add capital account convertibility to the already existing commitment to 
current account convertibility for members. 
Just like the IMF’s push for capital account convertibility, China’s pursuit of 
capital account liberalization was stymied by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. But 
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the government still seems determined to follow this path as the 12th Five-Year 
Plan announced the decision to “gradually achieve convertibility of the renminbi 
under capital accounts,” followed by the decisions of the Third Plenary Session 
of the 18th CPC Central Committee to “accelerate interest rate liberalization and 
capital-account convertibility.”
THE EXTERNAL PRESSURE
There is no case that I know of in which a developing country has decided to 
introduce capital account liberalization as an objective in and of itself, although 
China may eventually prove to be the exception that proves the rule. And there 
are only a few cases in which such measures have been taken voluntarily, inde-
pendently of pressures from international considerations, either from developed 
countries or from multilateral institutions in the interests of expediency or 
efficiency. This is simply because liberalization of capital flows has an impact 
on virtually every other area of economic policy and is not a policy that can 
be introduced without appropriate compatible policy decisions in virtually all 
other areas of the economy. Thus, any discussion of “managing” capital account 
liberalization must go beyond the technical tools for influencing or managing 
capital flows, and must include the implications for “managing” other economic 
phenomenon. This is where the law of unintended consequences seems to apply.
In this regard, and given the pressure from the U.S. Congress to classify China 
as an exchange rate manipulator, the Japanese and Korean experiences of rapid 
liberalization starting in the mid 1980s are instructive. Under pressure from the 
U.S., Japan agreed to take measures to allow yen appreciation via the opening of 
domestic capital markets: 
. . . exchange rate considerations were the most important among a num-
ber of issues. Admittedly, what had so hardened the attitude of the United 
States was irritation regarding the alleged ‘insularity’ of the Japanese 
financial markets, which the United States rightly or wrongly considered 
to be a major factor behind the continued appreciation of the dollar 
vis-a-vis the Japanese Yen. At the same time the deterioration of the U.S. 
current-account balance was already obvious enough to foster protection-
ist sentiment in the U.S. Congress. . . . it is clear that the pace of financial 
deregulation in Japan would have been considerably slower had it not 
been for U.S. pressure and the resultant U.S.-Japan accord. It may be 
noted that, while the original intention of the U.S.-Japan accord had been 
to support the yen against the dollar by encouraging the international 
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use of the yen, in the event it had a very different impact. After the dollar 
had turned around in 1985 the Japanese deregulation measures helped 
to sustain capital flows to the United States and to curb any excessive 
weakness of the dollar. (Osugi 1990, 8–9—emphasis added by the author)
Again, the presumption that liberalization of the market would bring about 
equilibrium in the end produced the opposite result.1 The presumption was 
that market restrictions were impeding a higher flow of investments into Japan, 
when in fact what occurred was to allow domestic investors greater diversifica-
tion and produced a much larger capital outflow.
The final element of the Japanese experience is in terms of interest rate poli-
cies. It is well known that Japan participated as the major counterpart of the 
U.S. in the Plaza Accords to stem the unexpected one-way appreciation of the 
U.S. dollar even in the presence of a rapidly deteriorating U.S. external position 
and that the Louve agreements were an additional attempt to control what had 
become an opposite momentum movement. As the U.S. went into recession and 
desired to loosen the monetary policy stance initiated in 1979 under then Fed-
eral Reserve chair Paul Volcker, such an action would be worsened by the then 
excessive decline of the dollar if U.S. rate fell relative to Japanese rates. The U.S. 
imposed a reduction of interest rates, which, combined with the rapid capital 
account liberalization, produced an equity and property boom which brought 
Japan’s post-war high growth experience to an end. Japan had experienced aver-
age growth rates as high or higher than China’s and an external surplus that was 
also very similar. 
SOUTH KOREAN FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION: FROM PRUDENCE  
TO EXTERNAL BORROWING TO ASIAN CRISIS
Similar arguments can be made in respect to the problems faced in Korea when 
its current account surplus with the United States in the latter half of the 1980s 
caused trade conflicts. 
Accusing Korea of ‘manipulating’ its exchange rate, the United States 
demanded that Korea advance its trade and financial liberalization 
programs and make the liberalization programs more transparent. Korea 
1 That China is in a similar position was already noted in 2002: “The general impression drawn from the . . .  
characteristics of the Chinese economy is that China’s initial conditions do not resemble closely the starting point 
leading to a stylized capital inflow problem. . . . In particular, the scenario of massive capital inflows upon liberaliza-
tion seems less likely and less risky in China. . . . The main challenge for China probably lies more in successfully 
managing the liberalization of capital outflows through more diversified channels.” (Icard, 2003) 
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and the United States, to settle pending issues in their financial conflicts, 
agreed in August 1989 to hold financial policy talks as needed. Having 
had several discussions since 1989, both parties agreed to set out the 
three-stage Blueprint for the Liberalization and Opening of the Financial 
Sector. . . . The third-stage blueprint covers crucial areas such as interest 
rate liberalization, control of bank loans to chaebols, short-term finance, 
and foreign exchange and capital account liberalization. . . . It aim[ed] to 
achieve substantial liberalization of Korea’s financial sector by 1997.  
(Park 1996, 252–3) 
Nonetheless, South Korea’s financial liberalization since the early 1980s can be 
characterized as cautious and slow. The cautious approach to financial opening 
was preferred to prevent external factors from creating additional disturbances 
in the process of domestic financial liberalization. Indeed, this early resistance to 
rapid liberalization has been used to explain the growth success of Korea relative 
to Mexico, where similar liberalization measures were widely embraced but 
without the appropriate regulatory and supervisory measures. (Auerback 2001, 
Chapter 3)
Despite the slow pace of financial liberalization, South Korea’s financial market 
and financial policies accelerated in the 1990s. 
It is particularly puzzling that the Korean government acted in this way, 
counter to the whole thrust of Korean development policy for decades 
past. . . . the government placed great emphasis on joining the OECD, and 
the OECD made financial openness a condition of membership. As part 
of the same set of reforms, the government abolished the Economic Plan-
ning Board, the main body for making economic strategy since the early 
1960s, making the Finance Ministry the economic supremo. . . . Domestic 
corporate borrowers discovered that they could borrow abroad half as 
cheaply as they could at home. Foreign debt escalated, most of it private 
and short-term—maturing in twelve months or less. In Korea, foreign 
debt incurred by its banks and the companies that borrowed from them 
exploded from very little in the early 1990s to roughly $160 billion by late 
1997. (Wade and Veneroso 1998)
However, the government recognized the risk of an increase in capital inflows 
due to the interest rate differentials and had planned to delay until domestic 
reforms had produced convergence. Thus, 
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Despite continued extensive capital controls, a large interest rate differen-
tial between home and abroad, coupled with the bright prospects of the 
economy . . . made Korea one of the most attractive markets among the 
emerging economies to foreign investors. Furthermore, . . . even the partial 
nature of capital account liberalization undertaken during the pre-crisis 
period (mid-1990s) triggered massive capital inflows. . . . Consequently, 
the short-term external debt grew much faster than long-term debt 
throughout the years, and the financial sector became the major holder of 
external debts. Out of the total increase in external debt during the three 
years (1994–96), the banking sector explains about 70 percent. (Wang and 
Shin 1999) 
The discovery that the Korean Central Bank had virtually exhausted its foreign 
exchange reserves supporting the Korean financial institutions that had con-
tracted these short-term loans led to a withdrawal of lending to South Korea 
and the collapse of the exchange rate and full scale crisis. The subsequent IMF 
support placed the blame for the crisis on the policy of industrialization and high 
debt ratios of Korean monopolies and called for a wholesale dismantling of the 
Chaebol (family-owned business conglomerate) system and the introduction of 
even more rapid liberalization.
Noting the paradox in the argument that structural problems caused South 
Korea’s 1997 crisis while its very positive performances made the country a 
poster for liberalization policies before the crisis, Jang-Sup Shin (2013) has 
argued that the 1997 crisis was not caused by deep-seated structural problems, 
but a combination of financial liberalization leading to mistakes in risk manage-
ment by the government, financial institutions and some companies. 
Korea recovered quickly from the crisis despite the IMF program, not 
because of it. A high interest rate policy and radical structural reforms 
actually worsened the situation of the Korean economy by increasing 
corporate failures and bad loans in the financial sector. . . . the IMF-spon-
sored reforms had a long-term negative effect on the Korean economy by 
decreasing its economic growth potential. The country’s economic growth 
rate was in fact reduced to 4.7% on average during 2001–2007, about 
half of the growth rate during 1990–1997. Corporate investments were 
stagnant and the growth of the domestic economy was mainly led by an 
increase in household debt.
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Thus, despite a conscious effort to control the pace of liberalization and to 
defend the economy from the damage caused by rapid capital flow reversal, 
Korea was pushed into a financial crisis that allowed the liberalization and rapid 
dismantling of the development strategy that had been responsible for Korea’s 
successful growth performance. However, the introduction of these policies did 
little to resolve the problem of Korean trade imbalances with developed coun-
tries, which were quickly re-established in the recovery from the 1997 crisis.
INSTRUMENTS AND OBJECTIVES
Based on the experiences of Japan and Korea, the real question for China is how 
the instrument of liberalization can achieve the objectives desired by Chinese 
policy makers. A recent study made available by the Peoples Bank of China lists 
the benefits to be expected from liberalizing the capital account:2
• support of Chinese companies seeking to expand globally; 
• encourage structural adjustments in the economy by encouraging  
labor-intensive companies to relocate where labor costs are lower;
• increase cross-border use of the renminbi as a step towards internationalization. 
The PBOC study lists four initial conditions that make successful liberalization 
of capital markets possible: macroeconomic stability, large foreign exchange 
reserves, sound financial system, and adequate financial regulation as well as 
supervision.
The experience of Japan and South Korea would suggest that the last two fac-
tors are highly dubious, given that this experience derives from the period of 
substantial controls. There there is no guarantee that they will persist under 
liberalization.
Implementation is via three-step, ten-year process with the majority of the 
measures concentrated in the last five years: relax foreign direct investment (FDI) 
related to business investments over three years to allow Chinese companies to 
invest abroad; relax controls on commercial credit related to merchandise trade 
activity and support further RMB internationalization over three to five years; 
liberalize portfolio investments, real-estate investments, and other bank-related 
capital flows within five to ten years. 
2 Reported in http://scepticalmarketobserver.blogspot.com/2012/03/capital-account-liberalisation-in-china.html
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Other proposals include liberalizing capital inflows before capital outflows, long-
term capital ahead of short-term capital, institutional investors before individual 
investors, and non-residents’ investments in China ahead of residents’ invest-
ments overseas.
It is exemplary that the PBOC report does not deal with any of the issues noted 
above from the experience of other Asian countries, in particular the structure of a 
liberalized domestic financial system, and the impact of liberalization on interest 
rates and exchange rates. In particular, it is interesting that the factors listed as sup-
porting liberalization are very similar to the initial conditions noted by Icard (2003) 
that would lead to risks of capital outflows, making the sequencing of inflows and 
outflows important. The PBOC report also fails to take into account the impact of 
increased volatility in exchange rates and capital flows, which will have a direct 
impact on the role of the RMB as an invoice and settlement currency. 
This Asian experience in the context of this timetable suggests three lessons. The 
first is that the immediate impact of liberalization will be unpredictable, which 
thus supports the preference for gradual liberalization. The second is that since 
this means the impact on the exchange rate will be unpredictable, a clear objec-
tive on exchange rate policy3 should be the driving force in decisions on liberal-
ization. Finally, it has been clearly demonstrated that the sequencing of measures 
should be different for foreign investment in domestic assets than with domestic 
investments in foreign assets—and be coordinated with exchange rate policy.
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8. Deregulated Finance in China:  
A Critical Analysis
Sunanda Sen
REFORMS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
Financial reforms in a country cannot be presumed to contribute to stability, a 
point which can be borne out by developments in China’s financial sector over 
the last few years1. In particular, the market, when freed from the prevailing 
regulations, is prone to greater degrees of uncertainty with expectations of fur-
ther changes, which can be destabilizing. A look at the different stages of capital 
account deregulation in China signals a need for caution in such policies.
A review of the process of financial deregulation shows some major breaks in 
China’s capital account regulation, each indicating substantial changes in the 
management of the currency.
The first relates to an announcement in 2005 that ended the prevailing fixed 
official rate of RMB at 8.27 per dollar, largely with pressures from the U.S. The 
exchange rate of the RMB immediately moved up and has been subject to fre-
quent appreciations since then. 
 The second break in China’s currency management came in 2007 as foreign 
currency was allowed to be held privately. However, with RMB continuing to 
appreciate, those private holdings did not immediately affect the RMB rate in  
the market via speculation (Long 2013).
The third and a major break in China’s currency policy came in September 
2011 with the “advent of RMB’s two-way floating process” (Long and Qiaowei 
2012). This ended a long-standing consensus on the uni-directional movement 
of the renminbi rate, which prevailed until then. The measure, in principle, per-
mitted the currency to actually depreciate for the first time in April 2012, when 
it started depreciating over at least the next six months.2 (Even after September 
2011, appreciations in the RMB continued, though at a slower rate, until April 
2012 (Long 2013)).
1 For more analysis, see Sen 2012 pp. 263–300 
2  According to exchange-rates.org on 7/5/2012 and 1/11/2013 
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In the meantime, currency management in China had taken a new turn with a 
fourth change in April 2012 as the daily trading limit of the currency rate was 
officially widened from 0.5 percent to 1 percent. The measure, while allowing 
the exchange rate to move widely in either direction, was also expected, as held 
by Chinese experts, to encourage the use of the RMB in international markets.3 
The measure heralded the downward movements in the rate, which, as men-
tioned above, took place between April and August 2012.
Finally, the latest twist in China’s financial management came with the 
announcements of a free trade zone in Shanghai at the Party Congress held in 
November 2013. The major reforms include the setting up of the Shanghai zone 
with full currency convertibility and the deregulation of the interest rate through-
out the country. 
3 The measure also worked as a signal for further deteriorations in the country. See for details “China widens 
yuan’s trading bank against USD” Xinhuanet News, 14 April 2014, news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-
04/14/c_131526335.htm 
Figure 1: Components of China’s Balance of Payments
Source: State Administration of Foreign Exchange, www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/english/ 
Note: The negative turn as above in the financial balance can partly be explained by the negative 
investment income balance, which seems paradoxical, especially with China’s large holdings of 
U.S. Treasury Bills. An explanation lies in the consistently lower rates of return on those bills as 
compared to those on the foreign holdings of Chinese assets.
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DEREGULATION AND THE BUILT-IN INSTABILITIES 
It is possible to trace some of the destabilizing forces as outcomes from the 
changes in China’s financial sector regulations discussed above.
But first, let’s focus on China’s external balance, which since 2011 has been sub-
ject to some unprecedented declines in its financial account balance. The latter 
turned negative for the first time in Q4 of 2011 and later again, in Q2 and Q3 of 
2012 (SAFE n.d). Changes as 
noted above in the financial 
balance throw open many 
questions, including whether 
there has been capital flight 
from China (Shibo and Long 
2012).
The negative turn in the finan-
cial balance can partly be explained by the negative investment income balance, 
which seems paradoxical, especially with China’s large holdings of U.S. Treasury 
Bills. An explanation lies in the consistently lower rates of return on those bills 
as compared to those on the foreign holdings of Chinese assets (Yongding 2014). 
Continuing to look at the negative flows in China’s financial balance, one also 
observes the negatives in China’s foreign exchange balance, indicating propor-
tionate additions to stocks of official reserves, which has been continuing since 
Q1 of 2011 or even earlier in China’s balance of payment. Additions to official 
reserves resulted from the consistently large trade surpluses along with the large 
FDI inflows the country has been receiving over years. 
It is not difficult to trace the sweep of speculation in China’s markets over recent 
years. One indication is the increased inflows of portfolio capital, which of late 
has been as large as $929 billion in Q4 of 2012, primarily through the use of 
wealth management funds. As explained in a piece in The Wall Street Journal, 
these are “typically short-term investments that banks market as a high-yield 
alternative to bank deposit rates, which are kept low by the government. About 
half are invested in low-risk assets such as government and corporate bonds 
and money-market products. . . . But many others are backed by everything from 
loans to developers to accounts receivable to valuables such as gold and jewels” 
(McMahon and Back 2013). With portfolio capital, the liabilities (as inflows) simi-
It is not difficult to trace the sweep of 
speculation in China’s markets over recent 
years. One indication is the increased 
inflows of portfolio capital, which of late 
has been as large as $929 billion in Q4 of 
2012, primarily through the use of wealth 
management funds. 
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larly overshot the rise in China’s assets (or outflows), thus making for net inflows.4 
All of the above generated additions to reserves, which was causing negative 
sums in the balance of payments via financial balance. 
Looking further at the factors causing the negative financial balance in the 
balance of payments, one notices a reversal in “‘other investments” since Q4 of 
2011. This is related to several factors discussed below: 
(a) A drop in net short term trade credits, the negative sum of which reached a 
peak at (-) $3.3 billion in Q2 of 2012. The numbers can be interpreted in terms 
of the drop in trade credits advanced (in China) against exports and a rise in 
trade credits advanced abroad against China’s imports, often linked to the 
continued rise in the exchange rate of RMB. Not surprisingly, net trade credits 
showed a sharp rise between Q4 of 2011 and Q1 of 2012, evidently caused by 
the depreciating RMB in the interim. 
(b) A negative balance in loans, short- and long-term, advanced by China since 
Q3 of 2011, which were found more convenient, for reasons which include the 
expected appreciation of the RMB. 
(c) Intermittent drops in the “currency and deposits” component of “other invest-
ments” in specific years, much due to the withdrawal of foreign currency 
(mostly dollars) from banks, again with expected appreciation of the RMB . 
(d) China’s external payments were also affected by tendencies on the part of 
traders to advance or delay transactions according to the expected changes in 
the RMB rate. Forex earnings against net exports were delayed, with payments 
deferred by overseas importers and payments advanced by domestic import-
ers, both to gain from the on-going renminbi appreciation, continuing until 
September 2011 and later after April 2012.
(e) As pointed out by Shibo and Long (2012), there has also been an issue with 
corporates who reacted to expectations of exchange rate changes. One notices 
that until the introduction of changes in September 2011, foreign companies 
with a long renminbi bias preferred to receive in renminbi and pay in USD, 
leading to an evident imbalance in renminbi receipt/payment of trade settle-
ment. However, after September 2011, the foreign companies started paying 
in renminbi and receiving in USD, which showed that they preferred short 
4 However short period inflows as above also contribute to vulnerabilities when there is a bunching of outflows, 
especially with portfolio inflows presumably positioned to make for capital gains by relying on an appreciating RMB 
rate, which generally prevailed in the market.
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renminbi and long USD. Consequently, the RMB settlement receipt/payment 
ratio shifted from 1:2.2 in Jan–Aug 2011 to 1.4:1 in Sep–Dec of 2011, with 
the overall ratio in 2011 still 1:1.3 (it was 1:5.3 in 2010) (Long and Qiaowei 
2012). With private holdings of dollars permissible since 2007, selling more 
dollars compared to what they received was possible with foreign currency 
loans from banks, which kept increasing in situations of anticipated RMB 
appreciation. According to Langsha and Chang (2011): “The data suggests that 
in aggregate Chinese importers/exporters were borrowing dollar from banks 
and converted them to renminbi. However, this long-lasted trend reversed in 
October 2011. The difference turned from large negative to slight positive.” 
As Chinese companies reduced dollar liabilities and increased dollar assets, 
it resulted in a rise of outflow in the capital account. This implied that dollars 
might flow out from private channels and cause deficits in the capital account 
(Langsha and Chang 2011). 
(f) Indications of the change in expectations relating to the RMB rate since 
September 2011 were also visible in the difference between cross-border 
receipt/payment balance and trade balance. The gap measured the advance 
or delayed payments of goods from both domestic and foreign companies, 
mostly positive before September 2011; the trend reversed after September as 
the Chinese importers speeded up the dollar payments. As could be expected, 
since September 2011, exporters tended to hold USD assets and repay USD 
loans. As a result, bank deposits denominated in USD increased much faster 
than loans denominated in USD.5
(g) Changes described above also affected the supply of liquidity in the domestic 
economy. Unlike the previous years when inflows of foreign currency were 
quickly transformed into RMB, the new pattern of private holdings of dollars 
after 2007 allowed less of liquidity creation due to the tendencies to hold dol-
lars in the face of a possible rise in the dollar rate. Thus, privately held stocks, 
as was officially permitted, now worked to pre-empt dollars held by state and/
or their conversions in RMB. On the whole, the monetary authorities in China 
since then have had a much reduced capacity to generate credit, a situation 
which calls for attention in the face of the renewed threat of a global recession 
originating from Euro-land.
5 “According to the SAFE report, bank deposits denominated in USD increased by 7bn monthly on average in Q4, much higher than Q1-3’s average of 2bn; meanwhile, loans denominated in USD increased only by 1bn monthly in Q4, much lower than Q1-3’s average of 7bn” (Langsha and Chang 2011).
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(h) An expected appreciation of RMB, which continued until September 2011, 
also led the value of China’s imports settled in renminbi at five times that of 
exports, which implied that non-Chinese traders were net renminbi receivers 
instead of payers. As a consequence, deposits by non-Chinese traders denomi-
nated in renminbi rose rapidly in Hong Kong. However, the growth in deposits 
decelerated in the last four months of 2011, when expectations of a renminbi 
appreciation was no more (Long 2012). As a result, renminbi deposits dropped 
in Hong Kong while deposits denominated in foreign currencies increased fast 
in Mainland China. It can be observed that renminbi deposits in Hong Kong 
and USD/renminbi exchange rate had been moving in opposite directions. 
Thus currency speculation worked as a major driver of the renminbi inter-
nationalization as long as the currency was moving upward, by making it a 
vehicle of transactions in trade.
(i) The effect of speculation on the USD/RMB rate can be seen by observing the 
tendencies in the intra-day rate (as market close price minus central parity), 
which reflect the market view on renminbi vis a vis USD. By contrasting the 
intra-day rate with inter-day rate (central parity minus market close price last 
day) which by and large reflect PBOC’s view, one can decompose USDCNY 
movements into two parts by distinguishing market view from PBOC’s view 
on USDCNY, which are often held with opposite positions. Data shows 
expectations of market depreciation on CNY by Q3 of 2012 despite official 
announcement that it is approaching equilibrium (“PBOC against the market 
on USDCNY,” 23 May 2012). 
However, as mentioned in the study referenced above, by using regression one 
finds strong negative correlation between the time series of inter-day movements 
and intra-day movements (See equation below). The opposite movements of 
inter-day and intra-day reveal PBOC’s strong will to keep the renminbi stable 
regardless of market trends.
Interdayt = — 0.001 — 0.885 * Intradayt-1, R2 = 0.5180
Applying the above framework to basket-CNY6 one gets much less negative cor-
relation between inter-day and intra-day movements with R-square at less than 
0.1, which indicates that PBOC (as well as speculators) still pay more attention to 
dollar rather than currency basket in onshore FX market, though it claims to do 
the opposite (“PBoC against the market on USDCNY,” 23 May 2012). 
6 The basket of currency consists of 50% USD, 40% Euro and 10% JPY, in accordance with China’s export 
structure.
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(j) As for the recent tendencies for a faster pace of FX deposits in mainland 
China, an explanation lies in the weakening of renminbi appreciation expecta-
tion (Long and Qiaowei 2012).
(k) Expectations of changes in the USD/RMB rate also gets reflected in the 
offshore markets of the currency, especially in Hong Kong. There has been a 
growing importance of non-resident investors in Hong Kong using the Non-
deliverable Forward (NDF) route in local currency bond markets, particularly 
in times of strain in local currency.7 It has been observed that the market for 
NDFs grew rapidly from April 2008 to April 2013, but not as much in later 
months. It is important to note that the NDF market tends to lead the domes-
tic market in setting the trend for the CNY (spot rate), especially in stressed 
periods when the latter depreciates. However, of late, the offshore deliver-
able forward (DF) for RMBs have been outcompeting the NDF in terms of the 
volume of transactions (McCauley et al. 2014).
It is held that the differences between deliverable forward (DF) and NDF rates 
of the currency reflect the effectiveness of capital controls. Also that the pricing 
7 This market was generally used to hedge against exchange rate fluctuations of the renminbi against the U.S. 
dollar. Although the Chinese currency could not be delivered, exchange rate differences against which a player was 
hedged were paid out in U.S. dollars. Therefore, the NDF CNY markets was actually based on future changes in the 
USD/CNY exchange rate. Players from mainland China could not participate in this market, although participation 
of onshore players in the CNH market is allowed (“China’s Currency,” n.d).
?
Figure 2: USDCNY Cumulative Inter-day and Intra-day Movement
Source: “PBoC against the market on USDCNY,” 23 May 2012, http://ineteconomics.org/blog/china-
seminar/pboc-against-market-usdcny 
Note: The two axes respectively indicate changes in USDCNY rates (Y axis) and dates relating to the 
latter (X axis).
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differentials tend to widen sharply in stressed market conditions, as happened 
with 2008–09 global financial crisis and later, in May–August 2013 during the 
Euro crisis combined by the selloff in emerging markets as a result of the antici-
pated tapering of quantative easing (QE) in the U.S. Thus, the NDF market has 
continued to operate in RMB’s offshore market as the main “adjustment valve” 
for asset managers holding long positions in local bonds and for firms with 
unhedged dollar bonds outstanding (McCauley et al. 2014). It can be noted that 
with assets held under NDF by non-Chinese their sales do not get reflected in 
China’s balance of payments.
As mentioned above, the NDF market drives the domestic market for DFs as 
well as spot rates during volatile periods. However, since 2010 an offshore deliv-
erable forward market has been trading in parallel with the onshore deliverable 
forward and offshore NDF markets. Data for offshore markets of Hong Kong for 
April 2013 indicates DF at RMB 7,102 and NDF at RMB17,083 (McCauley et al. 
2014).Thus the offshore DF is slowly challenging the NDF market of RMB. With 
prospects for a convertible RMB it may even lead to the merging of two markets. 
It may be noticed here that with Hong Kong having a separate spot rate of RMB 
(CNH), which tends to be slightly higher than the rate (CNY) prevailing in the 
Mainland, further channels are opened for arbitrage between the two areas; not 
only with carry trade by using the slightly overvalued rate in Hong Kong but also 
the interest rate differences between the two areas (Yongding 2014). In effect the 
higher rate in Hong Kong creates space for a revaluation of RMB at an unofficial 
level (See Figure 3 for the two rates).  
Possibilities of sharper movements in the exchange rate (as started with the 
announcement of the two-way floating in September 2011, and especially the 
widening of the trading band later in April 2012) thus created more than a single 
channel to speculate on the anticipated movements in the currency. 
Eventualities as above led to an outcome where the currency actually depre-
ciated, for the first time, from RMB 6.30 per dollar in April 2012 to RMB 
6.41 by August 2012 (“Chinese Yuan/U.S. Dollar Daily Exchange Rate”, n.d). 
While appreciations, though at a decelerated pace, in the rate have reap-
peared recently, expectations are building up for a possible depreciation of 
the currency in future (Reuters China Money, 23 May 2012). Expectations of a 
downslide in RMB are reinforced with signals, as indicated above, of a dete-
riorating BoP with negative figures for net investment income and financial 
balances in the China’s external accounts. 
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THE BIG BANG REFORMS IN CHINA’S FINANCIAL SECTOR 
Recent attention has focused on a set of further financial reforms that were 
launched in a high-powered meeting of Chinese Communist Party leaders in 
November 2013. The reforms include the setting up of a Free Trade Zone in 
Shanghai that would allow a full convertibility of the RMB within the zone. Prior 
to that, in 2004 China had already started using Hong Kong as an offshore RMB 
center, designating the Bank of China (Hong Kong) as a RMB clearing bank. 
London was to follow suit in 2009. By 2012, both Hong Kong and London were 
officially treated as recognized offshore centers for currency exchanges, thus 
catering to a variety of institutions and enterprises. Singapore followed suit in 
2013, with the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China designated as the RMB 
clearing bank in the city-state. While Shanghai FTZ happens to be one more to 
be launched in the genre of RMB convertibility (after Hong Kong, London and 
Singapore), its initiation turns out to be more than what was implied by other 
offshore centers.
The steps discussed above open the possibility of two-way RMB-dollar (or other 
currency) conversion, which will be within Mainland China. It is not yet clear if 
the PBOC will permit the Shanghai zone to maintain an exchange rate that dif-
fers from the rate prevailing in the rest of the economy. 
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Figure 3: Exchange Rates of USD in Mainland China and Hong Kong
Source: http://themoneyconverter.com/H KD/USD.aspx 
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Incidentally, one can draw attention here to the so-called “Dimsum bonds” 
denominated in RMB issued in Hong Kong (Kenny n.d.). These allowed foreign-
ers to invest in China’s capital market and in effect foreign companies located in 
Hong Kong could issue such bonds and get access to the rapidly growing capital 
market of China. As for similar possibilities in Shanghai, according to Dai Haibo, 
one of the Directors of the Shanghai FT zone: “Free-trade zone companies and 
financial institutions will be allowed to invest in Shanghai securities and futures 
markets, while qualified overseas individuals in the zone may open accounts to 
trade local securities” (“China Inaugurates Shanghai Zone,” 2013). The statement 
is indicative of situations which may loosen the national regulations. 
The Shanghai zone also intends to remove the minimum capital-regulation 
limits for companies registered in the zone, which by itself will provide incentive 
for corporates to bypass regulations in the Mainland by resorting to relocation to 
the zone (“China Inaugurates Shanghai Zone,” 2013). Financial reforms projected 
by the State Committee in November 2013 also indicate a move to liberalize 
interest rates in China as a whole, which serves to make bank deposits relatively 
attractive as compared to those with the Wealth Funds offered by banks and 
with shadow banking channels in the market (Zhu 2013).
Since Shanghai already is the major center of currency trading in China, open-
ing of the FTZ there indicates a gradual move towards full convertibility. It is 
worth mentioning that both Premier Li Kequiang and President Xi Jinping have 
officially agreed to use the Shanghai FT zone as a “testing ground” to allow trials 
of RMB convertibility in capital flows (Zhu 2013.)
CONCLUSION
What, then follows from the ongoing financial reforms in China? As for the free 
trade zone of Shanghai, while it may be too early to predict how the deregula-
tion will impact the rest of the Mainland in terms of financial stability or other-
wise, the discussion above provides ample evidence that policy moves in China 
to deregulate its capital account have been responsible for greater degrees of 
uncertainty and related vulnerability in the financial market. 
Those include the successive deregulations in China’s financial sector, with float-
ing of the RMB (2005), private holdings of dollars (2007), the widened band for 
RMB (2007), and later, the announcement for “two-way floating” of RMB (2011). 
These have definitely created considerable leeway that helped encourage specu-
lation on the currency rate. 
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Like speculation, arbitrage has also been prevalent in the foreign exchange mar-
ket, affecting flows of net trade credits, loans and other investments by taking 
advantage of the movements in exchange rate. Some of these provide an expla-
nation for the declines in the net financial balance and continue to cause con-
cern regarding China’s external payments. While the continuing trade surpluses 
have contributed, despite negative income balances (a product of arbitrage), the 
continuing large current account surpluses as well as increased stocks of official 
reserves, China’s balance of 
payments is no longer sup-
ported by the “twin surplus” it 
used to be. Notes of caution, 
if not concern, are in order 
regarding the facets of China’s 
financial sector de-regulation 
discussed above. 
Despite what is professed in the mainstream literature on the efficacy of free 
markets in generating stability and efficiency, a rudderless market under de-
regulation can result in movements into uncharted territories. In particular, this 
is true when uncertainty becomes central in the functioning of the market. The 
quick gains reaped by agents who manage or even manipulate the deals do 
not reach others who are less fortunate. It may be noted here that profits from 
speculation and arbitrage hardly generate real activity in the economy. The game 
thus is neither for a stable order in the market nor for expansions in the real 
economy. The boom in the real estate market of China also bears testimony to 
the need for caution. Deregulation and liberalization in China need to be looked 
at with caution, not only in the national interest of the Chinese economy, but 
also for the rest of the world.
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